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The role of the media in generating trust and distrust among regulatory actors

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Abbreviations, Participant short names

Abbreviations

ABI	Ability, Benevolence, Integrity
API	Application Programming Interface
DP	Data Protection sector
FI	Financial sector
FS	Food safety sector
ICR	Intercoder Reliability
SoMe	Social Media
WP	Work Package

Participant short names

UNIL	Université de Lausanne
UAntwerpen	Universiteit Antwerpen
IBEI	Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals, Fundacio Privada
HUJI	The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Uni-Speyer	German University of Administrative Sciences
AU	Aarhus Universitet
UiO	Universitetet i Oslo
UU	Universiteit Utrecht
Kozminski	Akademia Leona Kozminskiego
SCIPROM	SCIPROM Sàrl



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Summary

This research report presents the main conclusions from the analysis of media reporting and case studies to identify how the media influence trust-building processes towards actors in regulatory regimes, and how it is used by various actors in the regimes to do so.

The report draws on three data sources:

- Traditional news media articles
- Tweets from regulatory authorities and agency heads
- Interviews with actors within the regulatory regimes, including the regulatory authorities.

The analysis of the articles in traditional news media shows that the majority coverage of regulatory authorities is neutral in its valence. The analysis also shows substantial differences between the seven countries in the data, i.e., Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, Israel, Denmark, The Netherlands and Poland. Furthermore, the report finds that the financial area is covered most frequently in the traditional media. However, over time there are significant variations from year to year and between countries reflecting national developments and incidents.

The analysis of tweets from regulatory authorities and agency heads shows an overall trend of increasing use of tweets during the period of investigation. The analysis further shows that these increases in some instances appear to coincide with the investigated incidents of trust violation, i.e., that authorities increase the frequency of monthly tweets during the incidents or that the authorities' frequency of tweets changes systematically during and following the incidents. However, the analysis shows substantial differences between the seven countries in our data. Additionally, the analysis finds that the use of Twitter by agency heads is not as widespread as the use of Twitter by the regulatory authorities themselves.

The incident-focused case studies (including analysis of interviews) paint a rich and complex picture of how trust infractions appear, how media influence trust-building processes and how media are used by actors in regulatory regimes. The analysis finds that the different actors involved in an incident often had quite different perceptions of the role of the media in relation to the incident, e.g., whether the media contributed to a specific framing of the incident, or whether the media played a large role in relation to the incident.

1. Introduction

This research report addresses one of the main ambitions of the TiGRE work package WP6, being:

To analyse how the media influence trust-building processes towards actors in regulatory regimes, and how they are used by various actors in regulatory regimes to do so.

The report addresses this ambition based upon three types of data:

- Traditional news media articles
- Tweets from regulatory authorities and agency heads
- Interviews with actors within the regulatory regimes, including the regulatory agencies.

The report consists of two types of analysis: first, an analysis of the media coverage of the social media (SoMe) (Twitter) use by regulatory authorities and their agency heads from 2015-2020 in the food, the financial and the data protection sectors in Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, Israel, Denmark, The Netherlands and Poland. Secondly, an analysis of media coverage as well as actors in the regulatory regimes' perceptions of the media before, during and after the regulatory authorities were involved in incidents of trust violations, including two incidents per country. The time frame for those incidents varies but are within the years 2015-2020.

The main research questions addressed in the report are:

- How are regulatory authorities covered in traditional news media? How frequently are they covered, and how are articles framed in terms of valence (positive/negative/neutral)?
- To what extent do regulatory agencies and their agency heads use social media, and has this use intensified over time? How frequently do regulatory authorities and their agency heads in the food, the financial and the data protection sector in Belgium, Denmark, Israel, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Switzerland tweet?
- How are regulatory agencies framed during incidents of trust violations? Which trust dimensions are activated in media coverage, who raises the criticism and do agencies respond to the criticism?
- How do actors in the regulatory regime experience and perceive the generation of media reporting/news during incidents of trust violations?
- Is media used actively by regulatory authorities, their political principals, or other actors? If yes, how do they use the media during and after trust violations?

These questions are analysed across three policy areas: finance, food safety and data protection and different types of data are collected in seven countries: Belgium, Denmark, Israel, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Switzerland. For each country, two trust violations are analysed creating a total of 14 case studies.

Although the report includes analysis of regulatory agencies and authorities in three different sectors spanning seven different countries, the subsequent sections will primarily investigate the research questions in the context of the individual countries and trust-related incidents. There are two primary reasons why the report does not make across-country comparative analyses: First, the data included from the different countries challenge comparative analyses, because multiple actors involved in performing the regulation of a sector in some countries, e.g., in Spain where four agencies/organisations share regulatory authority in the food safety sector, whereas regulation is performed by a single actor in other countries, e.g., the food safety sectors in Denmark and Belgium. Countries with several regulatory authorities in one sector are not directly comparable to countries with fewer authorities in the same sector. Second, the incidents of trust violations investigated are quite heterogeneous, e.g., in terms of length, 'size', e.g., a major scandal to a minor period of intense criticism. The analysis does, however, include comparative reflections across sectors within each country, as well as across time for the individual regulatory agencies and authorities. Deliverable D6.3 will return to the comparative ambition of the project.



1.1 Conceptualisations and theory

In this part we introduce the concept of trust from which WP6 departs, present our definition of an incident of trust violation as well as describe the various types of roles that the media can play as a stakeholder of agencies per se, but also in relation to trust relations between an agency and other stakeholders.

The definition of trust is based upon Mayer et al., who define trust as “...*the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based upon the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.*” (1995:712).

In WP6, the ‘party’ to be granted trust are the regulatory authorities included from the three sectors.

In line with Six and Verhoest, citing Kroeger, we perceive trust to be granted to an organisation when “*an actor who trust an organization makes themselves vulnerable to the action of others who are guided by the organization, based on what the actor knows about the regularities of organization behaviour and about the behaviour incentives and norms as set by the organization.*” (Kroeger, 2012, p.747)” (Six and Verhoest 2017:5).

The definition of incidents of trust violations is based upon Kim’s definition, as:

“Consistent with the notion that trust is a multi-faceted construct that is comprised of both trusting intentions (i.e. a willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another in the presence of risk) and trusting beliefs (i.e. the perceived trust-relevant qualities of the trustee such as competence, integrity, or benevolence, upon which trusting intentions are based) (McKnight et al. , 1998), trust violations have been defined as any incident that lowers these trusting beliefs in and trusting intentions toward a trustee (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009)” (Kim 2018:271).

The concept of trusting beliefs of the trust-relevant qualities of the trustee resonates with the **ABI model** of trust developed by Mayer et al (1995). In the model:

- A refers to the **ability**, in our case, being the expectations of the regulatory agency’s competences to successfully complete its task,
- B refers to **benevolence**, being the expectation that the regulatory agency cares about the trustor’s interest and needs and
- I refers to **integrity**, being the expectation that the regulatory agency will act in a just way (see Latusek, Six and Verhoest, 2020: 4, italics not in original).

Or as described by Grimmelikhuijsen and Knies in the context of trust in government organisations:

*“Perceived **competence**: the extent to which a citizen perceives a government organization to be capable, effective, skillful, and professional;*

*perceived **benevolence**: the extent to which a citizen perceives a government organization to care about the welfare of the public and to be motivated to act in the public interest; and*

*perceived **integrity**: the extent to which a citizen perceives a government organization to be sincere, to tell the truth, and to fulfill its promises.” (2017:587, italics not in original).*

While knowledge about an organisation can be based upon direct experience with an organisation, e.g., between the organisation and its political principal, departmental actors or regulatees, it can also, for some stakeholders, be based upon media reporting concerning the organisation, e.g., as would often be the case for citizens’ perceptions and knowledge. As such, we argue, that the media provide for an important stakeholder which is providing both information upon which agencies stakeholders base their knowledge and upon which they make their ‘trusting decisions’.

The news media may play different roles vis-à-vis actors such as regulatory authorities.



First, the news media can be a channel for conveying neutral or ‘objective’ information and opinions on an organisation or, acting as an *infomediary*, as defined by Deephouse and Heugens: “*Infomediaries tell us what we do not experience directly and have the potential to render otherwise remote happenings observable and meaningful...infomediaries are formal organizations that provide mediated information to audiences...Infomediaries are a special type of stakeholder focusing on the collection and distribution of information about companies and social issues.*” (2008:542)

Second, the news media may also act as an institutional *intermediary*, who frames the stories of organisations and their behaviour, e.g., framing their behaviour in ways which suggests whether one can trust their ability, integrity and/or benevolence. In this role, news media may also convey other stakeholders’ perception and assessments of an agency’s behaviour (Deephouse 2000:1097; Rindova and Martins 2012). An intermediary is defined by Frandsen and Johansen as follows: “*...an individual, a group of individuals, an organization, or a meta-organization, whose primary mission is to mediate, that is, to represent an organization and/or a specific stakeholder group, and/or to intervene in the relationship between them either by furthering or by impeding the interests and activities of the organization in question and/or its stakeholders in a specific situation or over time.*” (2015:257)

Third, the media serve as arguable the most important *informal accountability fora* in which agencies and other types of public organisations voluntarily provide (Busuioc and Lodge 2017) or is asked to provide accounts of their behaviour to the public in general (Jacobs and Schillemans, 2016).

Somehow overlapping, the news media act as *fire alarms* and/or as *watchdogs* scrutinising agencies, and such behaviour may result in news media triggering and amplifying formal accountability processes (Jacobs and Schillemans, 2016: 27-28).

An incident of trust violation is therefore identified in WP6 as cases when the media report negatively on such an incident (reflecting either their own perception or reporting some other stakeholders’ perception) about regulatory authorities’ behaviour or non-behaviour which reflects that the qualities of the trustee, i.e., their competence, integrity or benevolence are evaluated/framed negatively.

Because news media are an important intermediary between a regulatory authority and its stakeholders, we argue that negative media coverage of a regulatory authority holds consequences for; a) stakeholders’ intentions to trust the regulatory authority (i.e., they will potentially be less willing to trust the organisation, as negative reporting will increase their assessment of the risk involved) as well as for; b) stakeholders’ beliefs in the agency’s trust-relevant qualities, including competence, integrity and/or benevolence (Deephouse 2000).

In addition, as indicated above, such negative reporting may in fact be coverage of stakeholders’ negative perception of these trust-relevant qualities, indicating a violation of trust on the part of the regulatory authority.

In other words, incidents of trust violations are defined as incidents in which regulatory authorities’ trust-relevant trust qualities including competences, benevolence and/or integrity are subject to negative media coverage. And/or incidents where there is media coverage regarding some behaviour or non-behaviour by an agency that is likely to result in trustors being less willing to trust an agency.

The trustors may, in this case, be the media per se which report the behaviour or non- behaviour reflecting a trust violation by the regulatory authority. But it may also include comments or reactions / responses to or descriptions of such behaviour or non-behaviour by other stakeholders in the news article, as already indicated above (see for example Gilad, Maor and Bloom, 2015 for regulatory authorities differential communication patterns).



Finally, it is worth noticing, that trust violations may come in different types (Kim, 2018:270; 276; Latusek, D., Six and Verhoest, 2020:18-19). In WP6 we investigate:

- Violations of both the competence, benevolence or integrity aspect of trust.
- Violations, which are ‘experienced’ and reported/commented upon by citizens; regulatees and/or the media per se, as covered in the news articles.

1.2 Report outline

The report consists of this introductory section including a conceptualization and brief outline of the theory on which the report draws. The next section describes the methods focusing on the data collection processes, coding of articles and core methodological choices. The analysis is presented in three main parts (sections 3-5) with subsections for each country. Every analysis begins with Switzerland, and the analysis of Switzerland is generally explained in slightly more detail relative to the other countries. The first part of the analysis (section 3) consists of the media coverage of regulatory authorities in the food safety, data protection and financial sectors in the traditional news media. The second part (section 4) consists of an analysis of the regulatory authorities’ and their heads’ use of Twitter. The third part analyzes the regulatory authorities in the three sectors in incidents of trust violations. This section includes a) case narratives of two incidents per country (i.e., Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, Israel, Denmark, The Netherlands, and Poland), b) media coverage in traditional news media one year before, during, and one year after the incidents, and c) the regulatory authorities and their heads’ use of Twitter during the incidents. The final section, section 6, concludes on the findings of the report including a comparative summary.



2. Methods

This section provides information about the collection of social media data (tweets), newspaper articles and incident-related interviews included in the subsequent analysis in the deliverable.

We begin this section by briefly introducing the process of choosing the regulatory authorities included in the analysis, after which we describe the different data collection processes and core methodological choices.

2.1 Identification of regulatory authorities

The selection of regulatory authorities for the analysis is based on the identification of core actors in WP2. In some of the seven countries the regulatory authority in a sector is shared by different actors, such as the Ministry, government agencies, and organisations or institutions, whereas the regulatory authority in a sector belongs to one actor in other countries. This means that the seven countries as well as the different sectors within each country differ in relation to the number of core actors included in the analysis. For this reason, we do not make comparisons in relation to e.g., frequency of coverage across countries, or sectors in the analysis; instead, we focus on developments within the regulatory authorities in each country. Annex A1¹ provides an overview of core actors from each sector and country.

2.2 Social Media Data: Collection of tweets from the regulatory authorities in the three sectors and their agency heads

The Social Media analysis includes a frequency analysis of tweets from regulatory authorities and their agency heads in three sectors in seven countries over a six-year period from 2015 to 2020 (both years included). In the report we refer to the top managers of these regulatory authorities as “agency heads” for reasons of simplification, although for some countries the regulatory authority may be split between an agency and other organisations or institutions such as the national bank. This means that e.g., the governor of a national bank will also be referred to as an agency head. The final year of the data collected took place in a context of the first year of the COVID-19 crisis, which may have influenced the authorities’ and agency heads’ use of tweets as a way of communication.

Researchers can apply for a developer account with Twitter. This account grants access, through the API v2, to Twitter data. The AU team was granted access to the developer portal following an application for the specific task T6.1 purposes. The use of the Twitter API requires specific data science insights, and these insights have high learning costs. Therefore, we decided that the AU team would be the only team to retrieve SoMe data for T6.1. The search and programming to retrieve the data were based on the; a) programming language ‘python’; b) Twitter’s own guidelines, and; c) different software suited for the purpose. The AU team got support from the UAntwerpen team to learn how to use the Twitter API, and the Python Script was written by the UAntwerpen team which was then shared with the AU team.

Partners were asked to fill out templates providing the AU team with simple information and keywords about handles (@) needed for the data collection. Based on this the AU team collected the tweets of interest in order to make frequency analyses. Overall, the purpose of the approach was to gain insights about frequencies and patterns around selected regulatory authorities and specific trust-related incidents.

Tweets of interest

We collected two samples of tweets:

1. The regulatory authorities’ tweets (2015-2020): Tweets from the authorities’ official Twitter accounts. The data is based on the authorities’ Twitter @name. We only collected data from *active* accounts, but inactive agencies are noted in Annex A2².

¹ Available upon request.

² Available upon request.



2. The tweets from the agency heads of the regulatory authorities. We collected tweets from all the respective agency heads from the respective authorities who have managed the regulatory authorities within the relevant period. We used the start- and end date of the employment (DD.MM.YYYY) to make sure that the tweets were of relevance. Agency heads with inactive Twitter accounts are noted in Annex A2.

Table 1 provides an overview of the number of tweets included from the regulatory agencies and their heads in the three sectors for the seven countries.

Table 1. Overview of tweets

	Regulatory authorities' tweets			Heads of regulatory authorities' tweets			In total		
	Food safety	Financial	Data protection	Food safety	Financial	Data protection	Food safety	Financial	Data protection
Switzerland	1278	2855	120	0	0	0	1278	2855	120
Belgium	4292	4589	707	0	0	243	4292	4589	950
Spain	44788	5323	4528	4399	145	239	49187	5468	4767
Israel	0	306	919	0	0	860	0	306	1779
Denmark	547	0	0	147	0	0	694	0	0
The Netherlands	8676	5232	1406	975	90	0	9651	5322	1406
Poland	5867	2371	1520	165	1117	0	6032	3488	1520

2.3 Media Coverage – collection and coding of traditional newspaper articles

Traditional newspaper articles have been collected for five years before the COVID-19 pandemic (2015-2019) and for one year during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020) that cover the regulatory authorities in the three sectors in the countries included, i.e., regulatory authorities in the food safety, financial and data protection sectors in Belgium, Denmark, Israel, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Switzerland.

The newspaper articles have been coded in two stages.

In the first stage, **stage 1**, we strived for descriptive insights about *frequency*/salience and *valence* in the media coverage of regulatory authorities during the six years of interest. In the second stage, **stage 2**, we investigated more elaborately the framing of a selected agency or regulatory authority in relation to a specific trust violation incident as well as identifying their response to this incident. Specifically, we investigated newspaper articles; 1) one year before; 2) during the incident period according to the frequency coding and, finally; 3) one year after the specific trust violation. In this second stage, we investigated 14 regulatory authorities and trust related incidents (two selected from each participating country).

Below, we describe the selection of newspapers for the analysis, followed by methodical choices in relation to stage 1 and stage 2, respectively.

2.3.1 Selection of newspapers

We developed a list of criteria to ensure some degree of consistency between the countries. Details on the criteria as well as an overview of selected newspapers can be found in Annex A3¹. We chose to analyze the

¹ Available upon request.



media coverage of the regulatory authorities in two newspapers per country to account for potential political differences in the media coverage.

Partners were asked to identify and select two quality newspapers from their respective countries and to make sure that they included one center-left orientated and one center-right orientated newspaper from each country, thereby ensuring newspapers from each side of the political spectrum which were not too radical in their orientation. The primary aim of the newspaper criteria was to create a somehow representative picture of the traditional newspaper landscape within the scope of the WP. At the same time, we aimed to have as exhaustive a sample as possible within our resources.

Some of the partner countries are bilingual. The main consideration regarding federal multilingual countries is whether we should choose the national newspapers (left – right) from the same language groups (which would then be more closely linked to the interests and information needs of specific regions), or whether we should aim to cover different language groups (which would better cover different information needs across the country). In Belgium, we included two regional papers from the Flemish region. We chose two Dutch-language newspapers, as Dutch is the largest language group in the Flemish region. In Spain, we chose a Spanish (Madrid) newspaper and a Catalan newspaper. Despite being mostly distributed in Catalonia, *la Vanguardia* (the Catalan choice) has Spain's fourth-highest circulation among general-interest newspapers, so it is salient despite the territorial cleavage in Spain. Finally, for Switzerland we included a French newspaper and a German newspaper for representativeness.

2.3.2 Stage 1: Frequency and valence of newspaper coverages of regulatory authorities

In the first stage, we strived for descriptive insights about frequency/salience and valence in the media coverage of the regulatory authorities from the three sectors, i.e., food safety, data protection and financial regulation. First, the frequency coding enables us to answer the question about how much media coverage regulatory authorities in the three sectors got within the duration of six whole years (2015-2020) in the seven countries. Second, the valence coding provides insights concerning the relative degree of positive, neutral, and negative media coverage of the regulatory authorities in the seven countries during the time period.

2.3.2.1 Samples of articles and data collection processes

The selected newspaper articles were identified using key words or phrases (e.g. names of the regulatory authorities and abbreviations) and subsequently downloaded from digital platforms. Some partners found platforms from which they could extract exhaustive data samples of media coverage from the newspapers included for the relevant period in their countries, while others ran into minor challenges. The aim was to achieve sample sizes of approx. 2000-2500 articles given the resources available for the subsequent coding. Table A3 and A4 in the Annex provides a description of the media sources and article download process in each country.

Two partners ended up with smaller samples. From the Netherlands we ended up with approx.1500 articles. From Israel, however, we only managed to achieve a total of 315 articles, which may be explained by Israel's unique political situation as a country experiencing internal and external conflicts. In addition, the relative low number of articles corresponds with, e.g., an analysis of media coverage of Israel's High Court which revealed a similar image (Bogoch and Holzman-Gazit, 2021). In the High Court media coverage, the state bodies themselves were rarely criticised. Instead, criticism was often focused on controversial political issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and religious-state dynamics. Israeli journalists generally support the state's essential values and inner logic when criticising particular behaviours (Neiger et al. 2010). It can be said that the affirmation of the state values in Israeli media as well as the polarising political challenges create a lack of interest in the regulatory bodies themselves as actors to be criticised.

Other partners like Poland, Spain and Switzerland had too many articles, and news articles in those countries were subject to systematic sampling. Systematic sampling means that you generate a random number between, e.g., 1 and 3 and then start removing every third article, starting from the generated number, to



reduce the sample by 1/3 in this case. Before sampling, we sorted the articles by date to create a balanced sample for the whole period. The distribution of articles across newspapers and the three sectors is shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Distribution of newspaper articles across news outlets and sectors (before sampling)

University	Systematic sampling	Total No. of articles	No. of centre-left articles per country	No. of centre-right articles per country	sector	No. of articles in sector
AU	No	2241	826	1415	DP	266
					FI	1349
					FS	626
HUJI	No	247	104	143	DP	134
					FI	74
					FS	34
IBEI*	No	2186	1107	1079	DP	278
					FI	1512
					FS	396
Kozminski*	Yes (1/3)	1561	759	802	DP	102
					FI	1370
					FS	89
UAntwerpen*	No	2707	1023	1684	DP	427
					FI	1864
					FS	416
UNIL	Yes (only for FI sector)	2485	933	1552	DP	232
					FI	1915
					FS	338
UU	No	1563	709	854	DP	505
					FI	603
					FS	455

**The search was supplemented by acronyms or key words (see Annex A3 for notes)*

2.3.2.2 Coding procedure for stage 1: frequency and valence

To ensure reliability in the manual coding of valence across the countries and to assist the identification of valence in the articles in the seven countries included, the AU team distributed a detailed codebook to the partners and held a digital coding seminar. Additionally, the codebook included guidelines about how to identify incidents. The codebook can be found in Annex A4¹. To ensure that the coders understood the

¹ Available upon request.



concept of trust violation incidents, we asked them to carefully read a conceptualisation formulated by the AU team and commented on by the WP6 partners from UU and UAntwerpen.

Coding Seminar 1

The first coding seminar introduced the coding of the valence, that is the positive, neutral or negative coverage of regulatory authorities. The seminar was held as a digital seminar, started by introducing the coders to the regulatory context in which the regulatory authorities operate, followed by a presentation of the codebook (see Annex A4). After the presentation all coders were asked to code the valence of five English newspaper articles on the UK financial regulator. UK articles were chosen for language purposes. After the coding exercise the AU team presented their coding to all participants and in case of deviations in coding of the articles across the coders surfaced, it was subject for discussion and clarification in terms of how to interpret the codebook and the articles.

Coding platform: Microsoft Access

To provide all coders with a universal and simple coding platform, we created a template for the coding in Microsoft Access.

2.3.2.3 Intercoder reliability

An intercoder reliability (ICR) test is a crucial step in order to substantiate the credibility and reliability of the coding process. The aim of an ICR test is to access and increase the consistency and transparency of the coding process, and thus to convey that specific efforts have been made to ensure that the analysis represents a credible account of the data (O'Connor & Joffe: 2, 2020). Additionally, ICR fosters reflexivity and dialogue within the research team, thereby contributing to increase the coding consistency across countries.

We access the reliability of the coding in stage 1 using Krippendorff's alpha.

Krippendorff's alpha

Previous reviews of the literature indicate that the most common method is simply reporting the percentage of data units on which coders agree (Feng, 2014; Kolbe & Burnett). However, percentage-based approaches are sometimes rejected, because percentage figures are inflated by some agreement occurring by chance (Cohen, 1960; Hallgren, 2012; Lombard et al., 2002). The statistical test Krippendorff's alpha corrects for the probability that a certain amount of agreement occurs by chance. For that reason, Krippendorff's alpha is the preferred statistical method (Feng, 2014).

There is no agreement in the literature on the optimal sample size for an ICR-test (Ibid.). According to Krippendorff (2004) the required sample size is however at 34 and the smallest acceptable alpha is .667 at significance level of .05. We use the statistical software STATA to calculate the Krippendorff's Alpha values.

Stage 1 ICR test

To access reliability of the newspaper coding and to increase consistency between coders, we asked the coders to conduct a within-country ICR test in stage 1. The test was in the initial phase of the coding. The ICR test was conducted on 50 articles per country. Given the research question, we conducted the ICR-test on the valence code that has three values (negative/positive/neutral). The ICR test focused on the first 50 articles in the countries' respective samples. The articles were independently coded by the two coders in each country (except Kozminski who only has one coder). Based on the results of ICR test 1, the coders were asked to discuss coding consistencies and inconsistencies within countries. The AU team also provided feedback on specific issues.

We used the Krippendorff alpha value to access the ICR within countries. We did supplement this approach with a simple percentage-based approach for an ICR-value. This was due to the fact that most articles in this study was coded as neutral, so a few inconsistencies in the negative/positive codes would affect the Krippendorff's Alpha value considerably and not necessarily reflect the overall consistency in the coding.



Hence, a simple agreement could reveal if low Krippendorff's alpha values was affected by a few inconsistencies in the coding. Table 3 shows the result of the two ICR test in stage 1.

Table 3. Stage 1 ICR test

	Negative Kripp. alfa	Positive Kripp. Alfa	Neutral Kripp.alfa	Overall Kripp. alfa	SA – simple agreement (Percentage)
AU	0,39	0,34	0,12	0,28	0,60
AU_RETTET	0,39	0,34	0,42	0,38	0,80
IBEI	-0,01	0,73	0,56	0,43	0,88
UAntwerpen	0,56	-0,02	0,63	0,39	0,84
UNIL	-0,04	-0,01	0,46	0,14	0,88
HUJI	0,26	0,34	0,35	0,32	0,76
UU	0,74	0,12	0,75	0,54	0,78

2.3.3 Stage 2 Coding: Framing of agencies during incidents of trust violation

Stage 2 involved a more elaborate coding of articles surrounding incidents of trust violations for each agency. Stage 2 focused on the framing of 14 regulatory authorities (two for each partner country). The period of interest in stage 2 was 1) one year before; 2) the period of incident according to frequency coding and; 3) one year following the incident.

2.3.3.1 Identification and selection of incidents

During the frequency coding in stage 2, incidents were identified in every sector. The coders were asked to note if the same issue/incident was covered in at least five different articles. Furthermore, partners were asked to use the same coder for each sector in order for the coders to gain an overview of the articles (and incidents) within a specific sector. Coders were to provide relevant information about the character of the trust violation as a framework for the selection in this stage (See description of codebook 1 in Annex A5¹). Due to the small number of Israeli articles, it was not possible to include Israel in the analysis of incident related articles in stage 2. After the partners had identified incidents, the AU team went through all incidents and the relevant information to see if any parameters should be hold constant and to discuss patterns and agree on the most relevant criteria for the final selection e.g., salience. Based on this discussion the AU team decided that the baseline for the field of subject should be the sector focuses in WP2. This meant a focus on; 1) electronic data and health data in the data protection sector; 2) animal welfare and sustainable agriculture in the food safety sector; and 3) micro-prudential affairs in banking and securities in the finance sector. Some of the regulatory authorities were involved in other areas with higher salience (e.g., a national bank that was involved in macro-prudential affairs), but we decided to avoid these incidents in order to ensure consistency across TiGRE's WPs. The incidents were discussed between partners involved in WP6 to ensure the comparative logic in the selection of the final two incidents for each country. In the discussion, all incidents were presented in a comparative systematic manner based on the trust violation relevant information that the coders provided in stage 1.

After these joint discussions, the AU team had bilateral dialogues with individual partners regarding the final selection of two incidents per country. In this dialogue, we strived to ensure at least two incidents in every sector and to have comparable incidents across countries within the same sector.

The next step after the identification and selection of incidents, was to set start and end dates for every incident. The AU team sent guidelines to partners on how to settle an incident period and discussed it with

¹ Available upon request.



the individual partners. Focus was primarily on how to identify incidents end dates. Details can be found in Annex A5/6 (codebook).

Table 4 below provides an overview of the chosen incidents and their duration.

Table 4. Overview of incidents and duration.

Switzerland	Period	Sector
Incident 1: The BSI case	5/2016-12/2017	Financial sector (FI)
Incident 2: The “SwissCovid” case	3/2020-6/2020	Data Protection
Belgium	Period	Sector
Incident 1: The Optima case	6/2016 - 6/2017	Financial sector (FI)
Incident 2: The Fipronil/Veviba case	7/2017 - 12/2018	Food safety (FS)
Spain	Period	Sector
Incident 1: The Data protection case	2/2017 - 5/2018	Data Protection
Incident 2: The Banco Popular’s resolution case	6/2017 - 4/2018	Financial sector (FI)
Israel	Period	Sector
Incident 1: GodTV	Not applicable	Data Protection
Incident 2: Al Jazeera	Not applicable	Data Protection
Denmark	Period	Sector
Incident 1: Whitewashing case	3/2017 - 5/2019	Financial sector (FI)
Incident 2: MRSA case	9/2016 - 11/2016	Food safety (FS)
The Netherlands	Period	Sector
Incident 1: The Fipronil case	7/2017 - 4/2021 (Only have data from 2015 to 2020. Therefore, only results for 7/2017 to 12/2020)	Food safety (FS)
Incident 2: The Horsemeat case	1/2013-12/2017 (again only have data from start 2015. Therefore start is 1/2015)	Food safety (FS)
Poland	Period	Sector
Incident 1: Co-operative Savings Case	3/2015 - 10/2019	Financial sector (FI)
Incident 2: Supervision Authority Leadership Case	Same as above. 2/2018-12/2020	Financial sector (FI)



2.3.3.2 Coding stage 2: Framing of agencies

In stage 2, the AU team provided the coders with a deductive and detailed codebook to ensure high reliability across countries (see Annex A6¹). Articles a year leading up to and a year following the incidents in each country were coded. This coding aimed at identifying the framing of the trust dimensions A, B, I in relation to coverage of the regulatory authorities involved in the incident.

The codebook first explains how to identify the relevant period (see section above). Second, it explains the codes and the coding procedure in three parts. Some articles are relevant to code more elaborate than others. Therefore, we distinguish between; 1) previous codes (coded in all articles); 2) ABI Codes (coded in all articles); and 3) in-depth codes (coded in incident related articles). This makes it possible to obtain a longitudinal overview of the trust dynamics before and after the incident. Additionally, it reduces the time spent on unnecessary coding. In stage 2, the coding is once again conducted in a Microsoft Access template.

Coding Seminar 2

As a preparation for the stage 2 coding, the AU team held a coding seminar with all the coders to introduce codebook 2. The coding seminar included a theoretical introduction of the trust ABI dimensions and a detailed walkthrough of the codebook. Based on the introduction to codebook 2, the AU team coded 6 relevant articles about trust incidents in the UK. The choice of English language article enabled all partners to participate in the coding seminar, and the specific articles were chosen because of difficulties regarding the interpretation of how to code the ABI dimensions. The examples were later included in the codebook (see Annex A6).

2.3.3.3 Intercoder reliability and pilot coding (ICR test 2)

Prior to the coding phase, ICR tests were conducted across countries instead of within-countries as in stage 1. Due to small sample sizes in each country in stage 2, within-country ICR tests would risk too low ICR on a large proportion of the relevant articles.

The AU team identified 40 UK articles of relevance within the three sectors. All coders were asked to code these articles. ICR tests were conducted and comparisons between each of the coders' coding to the AU team's own coding. This approach made it possible to discover concrete patterns of errors in the coders' coding and to provide active feedback to increase consistency across all coders.

Reliability was assessed via simple agreement and individual evaluations. The Krippendorff alpha value is very sensitive and because of the complexity of the ABI dimensions, we argue that it is more fruitful to assess the interpretation in every single code based on the text bites that the coders have used as documentation for their coding. The simple agreement values are primarily used to indicate if the coding is much different from the AU team's coding. The ICR test is presented in table 5 below, and details as well as the individual feedback to the country coders can be found in Annex A7².

Table 5 shows that simple agreement ranges between 56-87 percent. According to the benchmark scale by Klein (2017), agreement of 40-60 percent is an indication of 'moderate agreement', while 60-80 percent is 'substantial agreement' and 80-100 percent is 'almost perfect agreement'.

Table 5. ICR test stage 2

University	Ability (SA)	Benevolence (SA)	Integrity (SA)
AU	87,18 %	74,36 %	64,10%
IBEL coder 1	87,18%	74,36%	74,36%
IBEL coder 2	84,62%	71,79%	58,97%
UAntwerpen coder 1	58,97%	56,41%	61,54%

¹ Available upon request.

² Available upon request.



UAntwerpen coder 2	84,62%	61,54%	79,49%
UNIL coder 1	61,54%	56,41%	66,67%
UNIL coder 2	87,17%	53,85%	66,67%
UU	80,30%	66,67%	75,76%
Kozminski	82,06%	71,79%	56,41%

Note: Simple agreement (SA) = the proportion/percentage of agreement of coded units.

Additionally, the ICR test functioned as a pilot coding of Codebook 2. During the ICR test, the coders were asked to provide feedback on the Codebook and the template, so that the AU team could make sure to correct potential errors, clarify doubts or formulations in the codebook that did not make sense to the coders.

In doubt coding

In both stage 1 and stage 2 of WP6, the coders were asked to use the field “in doubt” code, if they had any doubt on how to code the articles. This code included a text box to insert the questionable data. In cases of doubt the coders discussed the article with the responsible coder in their country. If the coders in the countries were still in doubt, bilateral discussions of those articles were conducted between the coders and the AU team.

2.4 Qualitative Data – Collection of Interview Data in Relation to Incidents

The qualitative interviews are particularly suitable for capturing perceptions on a sensitive subject which in this case are the trust violation incidents (Soss 2006). The interviews were performed as semi-structured allowing ‘thick’ descriptions that provide an opportunity to interpret how something is understood and experienced (Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine and Dvora Yanow 2012). The method can thus provide access to in-depth insights into the interviewee’s perceptions of the themes. The focus of TiGRE is centered around regulatory authorities and the nature of these government bodies does rarely give access to the civil servants’ perceptions on specific issues. Furthermore, there are several nuances in the communication which are not accessible in media coverage and official documents. Therefore, a semi-structured design was chosen where the theoretical perspectives on trust and the different roles the media can play were operationalised into specific research questions. The approach was combined with more open questions allowing for respondents to provide novel perspective on the research questions. For further details, please see the interview protocol in Annex A8¹.

2.4.1 Identification Strategy

To identify relevant interviewees, the AU team developed an identification strategy that partners could use. It included three steps:

First, we asked partners to use their selected incidents from task T6.1 to select the two sectors of interest. In some countries, the incidents are within the same sector so here is only one relevant sector.

Second, partners were asked to identify the regulatory authority(/ies) who has been the primary involved regulator in the specific trust violation incidents. Within this agency, they were asked to identify 3 actors who have been actively involved in the communication during and in the aftermath of the trust violation incident. By “involved” we meant part of deciding ‘what, how, when, and to whom’ the communication should be performed to. More specifically, the agency head, the head of communication, and a head of divisions/departments responsible for the substance of the incident communication.

Third, we asked them to identify the other relevant actors (central stakeholders). Again, that is, people who have been actively engaged in incident during and in the aftermath of the trust violation incident of interest. By “actively engaged” we meant actors having voiced their opinions; reacting to the agency’s behaviour,

¹ Available upon request.



including how it communicated in relation to the incident – e.g., because the incident directly affected them (regulatees or organisations representing regulatees). This includes members of the opposition, governmental actors (ministers) etc. Therefore, it also includes actors who were involved in potential sanctioning of the agency and in holding the agency accountable for its behaviour in relation to the incident. The partners were asked to strive for 6-10 actors per incident, see Annex A9¹ regarding identification strategy. However, as it is apparent from Table 7 below, most of the partners struggled to ensure enough actors and did not succeed in achieving so. Potential interviewees declined to participate giving reasons such as sensitive information, the issue of anonymity, concerns regarding the use of the consent forms, and that the incident occurred several years prior. Additionally, in relation to some of the incidents, only a limited number of actors involved in the incident.

2.4.2 Interview Protocol

For the interview, the AU team developed an interview protocol including two interview guides for interviewees in regulatory agencies and among central stakeholders respectively. In Interview guide 1 (regulatory agencies), we were especially interested in identifying strategies behind the regulatory agencies' communication behaviour. In Interview guide 2 (central stakeholders), we were especially interested in identifying the perceived effects of the abovementioned communication in terms of effectiveness and trust. The interview guides were pilot tested internally by the AU team before it was sent to partners. This test/revision primarily showed that some questions only fitted regulatory authorities while other only fitted central stakeholders.

The final questions were designed to capture the following themes:

- Actors' description of the incident
- The communication to incident relevant regime actors' roles (during and after) (ONLY STAKEHOLDERS)
- Communication responses during and after the incident (ONLY REG AGENCIES)
- Substantial behaviour in relation to the incident (ONLY REG AGENCIES)
- Perceptions of the effect of the communication in terms of effectiveness and trust (ONLY STAKEHOLDERS)
- Perceptions of the use and role of the media – news media and social media – as a channel and actor per se of relevance for trust relations in the regime and for the agency to build or repair trust
- Perceptions of sanctions/rewards – and accountability aspects in relation to establish trust after the incident (ONLY REG AGENCIES)

Before conducting the interviews, the partners were instructed on how to prepare for the interview, which is elaborated in the interview protocol, see Annex A8.

As an additional preparation for the interviews, the AU team facilitated a digital introduction meeting with all the interviewers to introduce the interview protocol. The meeting included practical introduction of what to do before the interviews, during the interviews, and after the interviews respectively. The meeting was an opportunity to raise validity and reliability of the interview data by ensuring similar understandings of the activities related to the case studies (e.g., contact, how to act in the interview situation, how to process the data from the interviews etc.). In a cross-national project like TiGRE, several context related factors may influence the comparability of the results, but this introduction meeting was meant to ensure an approach to the interviews which was as consistent as possible across partners.

In some instances, in which respondents for WP6 overlap with WP3 and WP4, the WP6 interview was conducted before or after the WP3 or WP4 interview, however, while using the appropriate consent forms for each part of the interview.

The interviews were subsequently summarised in English by the partners. All partners were provided with excel templates with spaces for each interview question. Based on the audio files from the interviews, the

¹ Available upon request.



partners were asked to write the main points of the interviewees' answers in the spaces. They were asked to do it comprehensively enough for data analysis based on the summaries. This method allowed us to get the most important insights from the interviews.

Additionally, partners provided the AU team with case narratives related to the incidents based on a template that the AU had provided. In the template, see table 6 below, we concretely asked for a brief description of the incidents for the case study repository. This included the following information:

Table 6. Template for Case narratives

What we ask for	
Introduction of the agency involved in the incident	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formal name of the agency • Year for establishment of the agency • Core tasks of the agency • Parent ministry affiliation • Description of formal autonomy vis-à-vis the ministry • Board or not and role of board
Background of the incident	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the incident about? • How did the incident begin, e.g., who started voicing critique?
During the incident	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were there developments in what became subject for critique – and if so, from which actors? • Were there developments in who voiced critique? • Were the formal accountability mechanisms involved?
Ending	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How did the incident end? • Were there formal or informal sanctions – from whom?
Response from agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Description of the responses the regulatory agency gave in the news articles during and in the aftermath of the trust violation incident?

The AU team also asked for a brief description of activities related to the contact of interviewees in the task T6.2 case studies and for partners to describe relevant activities and/or challenges during the process in the last space of the table. This was to make sure that we have a record of the effort by the different partners. Table 7 provides an overview of interviewees for the two incidents in each country.

Table 7. Overview of number of interviews per country

	Incident 1		Incident 2	
	Regulatory Authorities	Stakeholders	Regulatory Authorities	Stakeholders
UNIL	-	1	-	4
AU	5	2	-	1
IBEI	-	2	-	2
HUJI	1	2	2	4
UAntwerpen	1		2	5
UU	1	4*	2	4*
Kozminski	2	6	1	7

**Note: two interviewees (stakeholders) were interviewed about both incidents in the Netherlands.*



3. Regulatory Authorities in the Traditional News Media

3.1 Switzerland

3.1.1 Frequency

Figure 1 shows the number of articles per sector per month from 2015 to 2020 (both years included), while Table 8 shows the number of articles per year per sector. As can be seen in Figure 1, there was some variation from month to month in the media coverage of the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, while the authorities in the finance and data protection sectors were covered at more stable levels. Generally, the regulatory authorities in the three sectors were covered with less than 15 monthly media articles, however with two exceptions for the authorities in the food safety sector. Table 8 shows that for all three sectors, the yearly media coverage of the regulatory authorities varies somewhat during the years of investigation.




Figure 1. Number of articles over time per sector in Switzerland

Table 8. Number of articles across sector per year in Switzerland

Sector	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Data protection	17	30	32	26	21	41	167
Finance	80	69	57	58	73	89	426
Food safety	47	51	63	34	35	47	277

Figure 2 shows the relative share of media articles per sector. The figure shows that almost half of the media coverage concerned the regulatory authorities in the finance sector, while one-third of the articles were about the food safety regulatory authorities, and the data protection regulatory authorities were mentioned in the remaining 19 percent of the articles. Please note that a systematic sampling was conducted for the regulatory authorities in the financial sector, and that the actual share of articles concerning this sector is larger depicted in Figure 2.






Figure 2. Share of articles per sector in Switzerland (2015-2020)

3.1.2 Valence

Figure 3 shows the relative share of neutral, positive and negative articles across the three sectors during the period of investigation. The figure shows that the vast majority of the news articles (88 percent) were neutral in their coverage. As shown in Figure 3, the share of negative coverage (8 percent) was twice the size of the share of positive coverage (4 percent).




Figure 3. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for all three sectors in Switzerland (2015-2020)

Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the share of, respectively, positive, negative, and neutral coverage for each of the three sectors. The ratio of positive, negative and neutral coverage is similar for all three regulatory authorities, however, with slightly more non-neutral coverage of the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector (Figure 4), relative to the authorities in the financial (Figure 5) and food safety sectors (Figure 6). In all three sectors 85 percent or more of the articles are neutral in their coverage.






Figure 4. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector in Switzerland (2015-2020)




Figure 5. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the financial regulation sector in Switzerland (2015-2020)




Figure 6. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the food safety sector in Switzerland (2015-2020)

Figure 7 shows the total number of positive, negative, and neutral coverage over the six-year period in the three sectors. The figure shows that there is some variation in the share of positive, negative, and neutral articles for each of the three regulatory authorities during the period, but also that the number of neutral article far exceeds the share of positive or negative article in all years and across sectors. In some instances, the share of positive coverage is clearly larger than the share of negative coverage (e.g. the year 2017 for data protection), while in other instances the reverse is true (e.g. the year 2020 for food safety).




Figure 7. Number of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in Switzerland per year

Figure 8 shows the relative share of positive, negative and neutral media coverage for each of the three agencies per year. The share of non-neutral coverage varies between 5-25 percent during the period, and



only two of the agencies – the agencies for food safety and financial regulation – have experienced periods with around or above 20 percent non-neutral coverage. For the regulatory authorities in the food sector the non-neutral coverage had a share of around 10 percent of the articles.




Figure 8. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in Switzerland per year

3.2 Belgium

Figure 9 shows the number of articles per sector per month, and Table 9 shows the number of articles per year per sector. For the regulatory authorities in the data protection section, Figure 9 shows a relatively stable and low amount of media coverage per month, and Table 9 shows a general decline in the total amount of articles per year. For the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, Figure 9 and Table 9 illustrate a relatively low amount of coverage in the beginning and towards the end of the period but large increases in coverage around the summer 2017 and spring 2018. Lastly, the regulatory authorities in the financial regulation sector have had a relatively high amount of media coverage over time, with some both short (e.g., around June 2016 or November 2018) and long (e.g., around February-June 2020) peak periods.

3.2.1 Frequency




Figure 9. Number of articles over time per sector in Belgium

Table 9. Number of articles across sector per year in Belgium

Sector	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Data protection	91	86	82	62	35	52	408
Finance	259	312	252	281	260	384	1748
Food safety	43	21	115	114	59	64	416

Figure 10 shows the relative share of articles per sector during the 6-year period, with 68 percent of the articles involving regulatory authorities in the financial regulation sector, and equal share of 16 percent for the two remaining agencies.






Figure 10. Share of articles per sector in Belgium (2015-2020)

3.2.2 Valence

Figure 11 shows the relative share of neutral, positive, and negative articles for the three sectors. Most articles (91 percent) were neutral in their coverage. As shown in Figure 3, the share of negative coverage was 8 percent while 1 percent of the articles entailed positive media coverage.




Figure 11. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for all three sectors in Belgium (2015-2020)

Figures 12, 13 and 14 show the share of, respectively, positive, negative, and neutral coverage for each of the three agencies. The ratio of positive, negative, and neutral coverage is similar for two of the agencies, the agencies in the data protection (Figure 12) and financial regulation (Figure 13) sectors, with 5 percent negative coverage, none or almost no positive coverage, and about 95 percent neutral coverage. For the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector (Figure 14), the relative share of negative coverage is 28 percent, while 3 percent is positive, and 69 percent is neutral.




Figure 12. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector in Belgium (2015-2020)




Figure 13. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the financial regulation sector in Belgium (2015-2020)




Figure 14. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the food safety sector in Belgium (2015-2020)

Figure 15 shows the total number of positive, negative, and neutral coverage per year in the three sectors. The figure shows that the amount of non-neutral coverage of regulatory authorities in the data protection sector is stable, and low across the period, while there is a bit more variation from year to year regarding the regulatory authorities in the financial regulation and food safety sectors.




Figure 15. Number of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in Belgium per year

Figure 16 shows the relative share of positive, negative, and neutral media coverage for the regulatory authorities in each of the three sectors per year. The share of non-neutral coverage is generally highest for the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector with between 40-50 percent of the articles being negative coverage in 2017 and 2018. For the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector, the share of negative

coverage is relatively stable throughout the years. For the regulatory authorities in the financial sector, the share of negative articles shows a slightly declining trend during the period.




Figure 16. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in Belgium per year

3.3 Spain

Figure 17 shows the number of articles per sector per month, and Table 10 shows the number of articles per year per sector. For the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, Figure 17, and Table 10 show a large increase in the amount of media coverage with hardly any coverage during the first three years and a large increase from 2018 onwards. The media coverage is relatively stable for the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector during the years and with only few monthly peaks. For the regulatory authorities in the financial regulation sector the media coverage is highest around February 2017 with 50 articles, while there are several less intense but longer periods with relatively high coverage. Additionally, for the authorities in this sector, the total amount of articles is lowest during the middle period (2016-2019).



3.3.1 Frequency




Figure 17. Number of articles over time per sector in Spain

Table 10. Number of articles across sector per year in Spain

Sector	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Data protection	47	17	38	40	36	28	206
Finance	187	135	151	161	140	181	955
Food safety	6	3	0	40	57	201	307

Figure 18 shows the relative share of articles per sector. Two-thirds of the media coverage concerned the regulatory authorities in the financial sector, one-fifth of the articles were about the food safety regulatory authorities, and the data protection regulatory authorities were mentioned in the remaining 14 percent of the articles.






Figure 18. Share of articles per sector in Spain (2015-2020)

3.3.2 Valence

Figure 19 shows the relative share of neutral, positive, and negative articles across the three sectors. Most articles (82 percent) were neutral in their coverage. As shown in Figure 19, the share of negative coverage was 13 percent, and 5 percent of the articles were positive in their coverage.




Figure 19. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for all three sectors in Spain (2015-2020)

Figures 20, 21 and 22 show the relative share of positive, negative, and neutral media coverage for the regulatory authorities in each of the three sectors. Figure 20 shows that the share of negative and positive media coverage is almost equal for the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector (around 7-8 percent), while the remaining 85 percent is neutral. For the regulatory authorities in the financial regulation, Figure 21 shows a relatively larger share of non-neutral coverage with 15 percent negative articles, 5 percent positive articles, and 80 percent neutral articles. Finally, Figure 22 shows that the neutral coverage is 80 percent for the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, while 8 percent is negative, and 3 percent is positive.






Figure 20. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector in Spain (2015-2020)




Figure 21. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the financial regulation sector in Spain (2015-2020)




Figure 22. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the food safety sector in Spain (2015-2020)

Figure 23 shows the total number of positive, negative, and neutral coverage per year in the three sectors. The figure shows that for the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector, the amount of positive, neutral, and negative coverage is low and relatively stable during the period with generally less than 10 non-neutral articles per year. For the regulatory authorities in the financial regulation sector, the amount of non-neutral coverage is highest in 2017 and 2018 with around 50 non-neutral articles. Finally, for the regulatory authorities in the food sector, the non-neutral coverage is mainly towards the end of the period.




Figure 23. Number of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in Spain per year

Figure 24 shows the relative share of positive, negative, and neutral media coverage for each of the three agencies per year. The share of non-neutral coverage is generally highest for the regulatory authorities in the financial regulation sector. For the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector, the share of negative



coverage is relatively stable over the years (generally 10-15 percent non-neutral articles). For the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, the share of positive, negative, and neutral coverage varies over the five year-period.




Figure 24. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in Spain per year

3.4 Israel

Figure 25 shows the number of articles per sector per month, and Table 11 shows the number of articles per year per sector. For all three agencies, the total amount of media coverage is generally low during the five-year period. For the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector the number of articles is somewhat stable, but with a tendency to decline towards the end of the period. For the regulatory authorities in the financial sector, there is a large increase in the number of articles in November 2020, but the number of articles per year is relatively stable. Finally, for the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector there are a few periods with more intense coverage, and some variations in the number of articles per year.



3.4.1 Frequency




Figure 25. Number of articles over time per sector in Israel

Table 11. Number of articles across sector per year in Israel

Sector	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Data protection	10	23	12	16	8	30	99
Finance	13	7	10	8	5	12	55
Food safety	8	5	8	5	4	3	33

Figure 26 shows the relative share of articles per sector. A little more than half of the articles (53 percent) concerned the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector, while 29 percent were about the authorities in the financial regulation sector, and 18 percent mentioned the food safety regulatory authorities.






Figure 26. Share of articles per sector in Israel (2015-2020)

3.4.2 Valence

Figure 27 shows the relative share of neutral, positive, and negative articles across the three sectors. The majority of articles (75 percent) were neutral in their coverage, and the share of negative articles 18 %, while 8 percent of the media coverage was positive.




Figure 27. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for all three sectors in Israel (2015-2020)

Figures 28, 29 and 30 show the share of, respectively, positive, negative, and neutral coverage for each of the three agencies. The figures show some variations across the three agencies. For the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector, Figure 28 shows that 25 percent of the coverage is negative, while 9 percent is positive, and the remaining 66 percent is neutral. For the regulatory authorities in the financial regulation sector, Figure 29 shows equal shares of positive and negative coverage (11 percent), and that the remaining 78 percent is neutral. Finally, Figure 30 shows that 91 percent of the media coverage of the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector is neutral, and that the remaining 9 percent is negative coverage.






Figure 28. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector in Israel (2015-2020)




Figure 29. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the financial regulation sector in Israel (2015-2020)




Figure 30. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the food safety sector in Israel (2015-2020)

Figure 31 shows the total number of positive, negative, and neutral coverage per year in the three sectors. The figure shows that for the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector, the amount of positive, neutral, and negative coverage varies between the years with most negative articles in 2016 and 2020. For the regulatory authorities in the financial regulation sector, the amount of non-neutral coverage also varies between years with a maximum of four non-neutral articles in one year. Finally, for the regulatory authorities in the food sector, the figure shows that there is a maximum of three non-neutral articles per year.




Figure 31. Number of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in Israel per year

Figure 32 shows the relative share of positive, negative, and neutral media coverage for each of the three agencies per year. The share of non-neutral coverage is generally high but varies between years and agencies.






Figure 32. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in Israel per year

3.5 Denmark

3.5.1 Frequency

Figure 33 shows the number of articles per sector per month and Table 12 shows the number of articles per year per sector. For the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector, the media coverage is relatively low and stable from month to month and between years. For the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, the media coverage is relatively stable but with a large increase during the fall 2020. For the regulatory authorities in the financial regulation sector, there is generally a high level of media coverage (more than 1200 articles during the five years) but also a variation in the number of articles with a few periods of intense coverage every year and a longer period with much media coverage during winter 2018/2019.




Figure 33. Number of articles over time per sector in Denmark

Table 12. Number of articles across sectors per year in Denmark

Sector	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Data protection	36	15	31	57	38	37	214
Finance	250	152	166	298	240	127	1233
Food safety	75	64	63	58	44	161	465

Figure 34 shows the relative share of articles per sector. Almost to-thirds of the articles (65 percent) concerned the regulatory authorities in the financial sector, while 24 percent were about the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, and the remaining 11 percent mentioned the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector.




Figure 34. Share of articles per sector in Denmark (2015-2020)

3.5.2 Valence

Figure 35 shows the relative share of neutral, positive, and negative articles across the three sectors. Most articles (84 percent) were neutral in their coverage, and the share of negative articles was 13 percent, while 3 percent of the media coverage was positive.




Figure 35. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for all three sectors in Denmark (2015-2020)

Figures 36, 37 and 38 show the share of, respectively, positive, negative, and neutral coverage for each of the three agencies. Figures 36 and 37 show that the share is almost the same for the regulatory authorities in the data protection and financial sectors with 83-85 percent neutral coverage, 12 percent negative coverage and 3-5 percent positive coverage. For the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, Figure 38 shows that the share of negative articles is higher with 17 percent negative articles, 1 percent positive articles and the remaining 82 percent being neutral media coverage.






Figure 36. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector in Denmark (2015-2020)




Figure 37. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the financial regulation sector in Denmark (2015-2020)




Figure 38. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the food safety sector in Denmark (2015-2020)

Figure 39 shows the total number of positive, negative, and neutral coverage per year in the three sectors. The figure shows a stable pattern of positive, negative, and neutral coverage for the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector. For the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, the pattern is somewhat stable during the first four years, but the number of negative articles increases in 2020. Finally, for the regulatory authorities in the financial regulation sector, there is an increase in non-neutral coverage from 2015 to 2018 after which the amount of non-neutral articles decreases again.




Figure 39. Number of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in Denmark per year

Figure 40 shows the relative share of positive, negative, and neutral media coverage for each of the three agencies per year. The share of non-neutral coverage varies between 5 and 30 percent between years and agencies.






Figure 40. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in Denmark per year

3.6 The Netherlands

Figure 41 shows the number of articles per sector per month and Table 13 shows the number of articles per year per sector. For the regulatory authorities in the financial regulation sector, there is generally a tendency of decreasing media coverage but with some variations from month to month. For the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector there is the opposite tendency, i.e., a tendency of increasing media coverage. Finally, for the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, there is a large increase in media coverage during summer 2017, but otherwise a relative stable media coverage.

3.6.1 Frequency




Figure 41. Number of articles over time per sector in The Netherlands

Table 13. Number of articles across sector per year in The Netherlands

Sector	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Data protection	54	53	62	97	93	138	497
Finance	119	86	104	61	60	68	498
Food safety	50	52	127	87	74	52	442

Figure 42 shows the relative share of articles per sector. The share of articles is approx. one-third for each sector.






Figure 42. Share of articles per sector in The Netherlands (2015-2020)

3.6.2 Valence

Figure 43 shows the relative share of neutral, positive, and negative articles across the three sectors. Most articles (75 percent) were neutral in their coverage, and the share of negative articles was 19 percent, while 6 percent of the media coverage was positive.




Figure 43. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for all three sectors in The Netherlands (2015-2020)

Figures 44, 45 and 46 show the share of, respectively, positive, negative, and neutral coverage for each of the three agencies. Figure 44 shows that 80 percent of the articles regarding the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector was neutral, 14 percent was negative, and 6 percent was positive. For the regulatory authorities in the financial regulation sector, Figure 45 shows shares of positive and negative articles of 16 and 8 percent, respectively, and 76 percent negative coverage. The share of negative media coverage is higher for the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector with 26 percent negative articles, 6 percent positive and the remaining 68 percent neutral as can be seen in Figure 46.






Figure 44. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector in The Netherlands (2015-2020)




Figure 45. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the financial regulation sector in The Netherlands (2015-2020)




Figure 46. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the food safety sector in The Netherlands (2015-2020)

Figure 47 shows the total number of positive, negative, and neutral coverage per year in the three sectors. The figure shows that for the regulatory authorities in each of the three sectors there are large variations between years in the number of non-neutral articles.




Figure 47. Number of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in The Netherlands per year

Figure 48 shows the relative share of positive, negative, and neutral media coverage for each of the three agencies per year. The share of non-neutral coverage varies between 12 and 45 percent between years and agencies. In some years, some of the agencies experience media coverage with equal amount of positive and negative coverage, but generally the share of negative coverage is greater than the share of positive coverage.






Figure 48. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in The Netherlands per year

3.7 Poland

Figure 49 shows the number of articles per sector per month and Table 14 shows the number of articles per year per sector. For two of the agencies, the agencies in the data protection and food safety sectors, the media coverage is generally low and shows a slight tendency to increased media coverage towards, respectively, 2019 and 2020. The amount of media coverage is generally higher for the agency in the financial regulation sector with a large peak towards the end of 2018 after which there is a decline in coverage again.

3.7.1 Frequency




Figure 49. Number of articles over time per sector in Poland

Table 14. Number of articles across sector per year in Poland

Sector	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Data protection	8	6	13	27	35	13	102
Finance	271	203	234	330	184	146	1368
Food safety	10	8	13	7	15	36	89

Figure 50 shows the relative share of articles per sector. The agency in the financial regulation sector has a share of 88 percent, while the remaining agencies each have a share of 6 percent. Please note that a systematic sampling was conducted for the regulatory authorities in the financial sector, and that the actual share of articles concerning this sector is larger depicted in Figure 50.






Figure 50. Share of articles per sector in Poland (2015-2020)

3.7.2 Valence

Figure 51 shows the relative share of neutral, positive, and negative articles across the three sectors. Most articles (73 percent) were neutral in their coverage, and the share of negative articles was 22 percent, while 5 percent of the media coverage was positive.




Figure 51. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for all three sectors in Poland (2015-2020)

Figures 52, 53 and 54 show the share of, respectively, positive, negative, and neutral coverage for the regulatory authorities in each of the three sectors. With some small variations the share of positive, negative, and neutral media coverage is similar for the three sectors, however, with a larger share of positive articles about the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector compared to the other two sectors.




Figure 52. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector in Poland (2015-2020)




Figure 53. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the financial regulation sector in Poland (2015-2020)




Figure 54. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the food safety sector in Poland (2015-2020)

Figure 55 shows the total number of positive, negative, and neutral coverage per year in the three sectors. The figure shows that for the regulatory authorities in two of the sectors, i.e., the authorities in the data protection and food safety sectors, the number of positive, negative, and neutral articles was stable during the six-year period. For the agency in the financial regulation sector, there was more variation and more than 150 articles with negative coverage in 2018 and usually less than 50 articles with negative coverage in the remaining years.




Figure 55. Number of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in Poland per year

Figure 56 shows the relative share of positive, negative, and neutral media coverage for the regulatory authorities in each of the three sectors per year. The share of non-neutral coverage varies around between



10 to 50 percent between years and agencies. In some years, some of the agencies experience media coverage with equal amounts of positive and negative coverage, but generally the share of negative coverage is greater than the share of positive coverage.




Figure 56. Share of positive/negative/neutral articles for the data protection sector, the financial regulation sector, and the food safety sector in Poland per year

4. Regulatory Authorities on Twitter

4.1 Switzerland

Figure 57 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the regulatory authorities in the food safety, data protection and finance sectors in Switzerland. For regulatory authorities in the data protection sector, the figure shows that the number of tweets has been at a stable, but low level across the whole period with less than 10 monthly tweets. For regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, the number of tweets was relatively stable and low until the beginning of 2018, after which there has been more volatility with peaks in especially July 2019 (app. 90 tweets), July 2020 (app. 60 tweets), and November 2020 (almost 70 tweets). For the regulatory authorities in the financial sector, there was no activity prior to January 2016. After January 2016, the regulatory authorities in the financial sector have been active at a relatively stable level (generally between 40-60 tweets) except for a plunge in March 2020.




Figure 57. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from regulatory authorities in the food, financial and data protection sector in the period 2015-2020 [Switzerland].

The heads of the regulatory authorities in Switzerland were not active in the period of interest for any of the sectors. There has, therefore, not been gathered any tweets for the heads of the regulatory authorities.

4.2 Belgium

Figure 58 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the regulatory authorities and Figure 59 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the heads of the regulatory authorities in Belgium.

From Figure 58, it is evident that the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector have steadily increased the number of tweets across the period with a peak in December 2020. For regulatory authorities in the financial sector, there has been a decrease in the volume of tweets. From January 2015 to January 2017, the number of tweets were steady at around 100 tweets per month. The volume of tweets then decreases to a level of around 60 tweets per month until April 2018. After April 2018, there is a further decrease to a level of around 30 tweets per month with some volatility. The number of tweets by the regulatory authorities in



the data protection sector has been relatively stable except for one period from September 2017 to November 2017 where the number of monthly tweets peaks.




Figure 58. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from regulatory authorities in the food, financial and data protection sector in the period 2015-2020 [Belgium].

Figure 59 only shows tweets from the heads of regulatory authorities in the data protection sector. The heads of the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector were not active until April 2019. After April 2019, the heads of the regulatory authorities have been more active on Twitter although with periods of volatility.




Figure 59. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the heads of regulatory authorities in the data protection sector in the period 2015-2020 [Belgium]

Note: Figure 59 only shows tweets from heads of regulatory authorities in the data protection sector as the heads of regulatory authorities in the food sector and the financial sector have not been active on Twitter in the period of interest.

4.3 Spain

Figure 60 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the regulatory authorities in Spain. The number of tweets from regulatory authorities in the financial sector and the data protection sector has followed similar trajectories. In both sectors, the regulatory authorities were relatively inactive in the first half of the period, after which the number of tweets increases in, respectively, the beginning of 2018 (Data protection) and towards the end of 2018 (Finance). The volume of tweets from the regulatory authorities in the foods safety sector was relatively stable until January 2020 onwards, where the volume increases substantially ending with almost 2000 monthly tweets in December 2020.






Figure 60. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from regulatory authorities in the food, financial and data protection sector in the period 2015-2020 [Spain]

Figure 61 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the heads of the regulatory authorities. The figure shows that there is high volatility in the number of tweets posted by the heads of regulatory authorities in the foods safety sector. There are several months without tweets, and periods where the heads of the regulatory authorities tweet up to 200 times during a month. The heads of the regulatory authorities in the financial sector are active on Twitter from summer 2015 until fall 2016, after which they become inactive. The heads of regulatory authorities in the data protection sector are inactive until September 2019, after which they remain active for a period until July 2020.




Figure 61. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from regulatory authorities in the food, financial and data protection sector in the period 2015-2020 [Spain]



4.4 Israel

Figure 62 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the regulatory authorities in Israel. The figure only shows the number of tweets from the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector and the financial sector, as the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector have been inactive on Twitter. The regulatory authorities in the financial sector have been tweeting since February 2020, after which there has been some volatility from month to month. The regulatory authorities in the data protection sector have been active from March 2016 to September 2017, however, with larger activity from May 2018 to December 2020 peaking in March/April 2020.




Figure 62. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from regulatory authorities in the financial and data protection sector in the period 2015-2020 [Israel]

Note: Figure 62 only shows tweets from regulatory authorities in the finance sector and the data protection sector, as the regulatory authorities in the food sector have not been active on Twitter in the period of interest.

Figure 63 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the heads of the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector. The figure shows that the heads of the regulatory authorities in the data protection began tweeting around December 2015 with some variation from month to month, however, generally following a decreasing trend.






Figure 63. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the heads of regulatory authorities in the data protection sector in the period 2015-2020 [Israel]

Note: Figure 63 only shows tweets from heads of regulatory authorities in the data protection sector, as the heads of regulatory authorities in the food sector and the financial sector have not been active on Twitter in the period of interest.

4.5 Denmark

Figure 64 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the regulatory authorities in Denmark. The figure only displays the number of tweets for the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, as the regulatory authorities in the other sectors have not been active on Twitter. As the figure shows, the number of tweets by regulatory authorities in the food safety sector has been fairly volatile with peaks in August 2019, March 2020, October 2020 and November 2020.






Figure 64. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from regulatory authorities in the food safety sector in the period 2015-2020 [Denmark]

Note: Figure 64 only shows tweets from regulatory authorities in the food sector, as the regulatory authorities in the data protection sector and the financial sector have not been active on Twitter in the period of interest.

Figure 65 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the heads of the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector. Similar to the regulatory authorities, the number of tweets by the heads of regulatory authorities began around fall 2016 and with some variation from month to month, however, with a generally increasing tendency from 2018 and with a large peak during fall 2020.




Figure 65. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the heads of regulatory authorities in the food safety sector in the period 2015-2020 [Denmark]



Note: Figure 65 only shows tweets from heads of regulatory authorities in the food sector, as the heads of regulatory authorities in the data protection sector and the financial sector have not been active on Twitter in the period of interest.

4.6 Netherlands

Figure 66 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the regulatory authorities in the Netherlands. The tweets from the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector were relatively stable for a period in 2015 and 2016. In 2017, the number of tweets peaks in July. After 2017, the number of tweets fluctuates between ca 100 and 250 tweets per month. The number of tweets by regulatory authorities in the financial sector has been relatively stable across the whole period. The regulatory authorities in the data protection sector were inactive on Twitter until 2018. The authorities were most active in 2018 and 2019 and with less activity in 2020.




Figure 66. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from regulatory authorities in the food, financial and data protection sector in the period 2015-2020 [Netherlands]

Figure 67 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the heads of the regulatory authorities in the food safety and financial sectors. The heads of regulatory authorities in the food safety sector were inactive until March 2017, after which they have tweeted somewhat frequently, however, with some volatility from month to month. The heads of regulatory authorities in the financial sector became active in September 2019, after which they have tweeted with monthly variations.




Figure 67. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the heads of regulatory authorities in the food and financial sector in the period 2015-2020 [Netherlands]

Note: Figure 67 only shows tweets from heads of regulatory authorities in the food sector and the finance sector, as the heads of regulatory authorities in the data protection sector have not been active on Twitter in the period of interest.

4.7 Poland

Figure 68 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the regulatory authorities in Poland. For both the regulatory authorities in the financial and data protection sector, the number of tweets has been relatively stable. For the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector, there have been long periods with little to no activity, but between September 2018 and May 2020 there was a big increase in the volume of tweets with peaks in March 2019 and February 2020.






Figure 68. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from regulatory authorities in the food, financial and data protection sector in the period 2015-2020 [Poland]

Figure 69 shows the number of tweets per sector per month for the heads of the regulatory authorities. The figure only displays tweets from the heads of the regulatory authorities in the food safety sector and the financial sector. The heads of regulatory authorities in the food safety sector have been more or less inactive throughout the whole period. The heads of the regulatory authorities in the financial sector have also been inactive for a long period, but there has been a spike in the number of monthly tweets in March 2020 and December 2020.




Figure 69. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the heads of regulatory authorities in the food and financial sector in the period 2015-2020 [Poland]

Note: Figure 69 only shows tweets from heads of regulatory authorities in the food sector and the financial sector, as the heads of regulatory authorities in the data protection sector have not been active on Twitter in the period of interest.



5. Regulatory Authorities in Incidents of Trust Violations –Traditional News Media and Twitter During Incidents

5.1 Overview of incidents

Switzerland	Period	Sector
Incident 1: The BSI case	5/2016-12/2017	Financial sector (FI)
Incident 2: The “SwissCovid” case	3/2020-6/2020	Data Protection
Belgium	Period	Sector
Incident 1: The Optima case	6/2016 - 6/2017	Financial sector (FI)
Incident 2: The Fipronil/Veviba case	7/2017 - 12/2018	Food safety (FS)
Spain	Period	Sector
Incident 1: The Data protection case	2/2017 - 5/2018	Data Protection
Incident 2: The Banco Popular’s resolution case	6/2017 - 4/2018	Financial sector (FI)
Israel	Period	Sector
Incident 1	Not applicable	
Incident 2	Not applicable	
Denmark	Period	Sector
Incident 1: Whitewashing	3/2017 - 5/2019	Financial sector (FI)
Incident 2: MRSA	9/2016 - 11/2016	Food safety (FS)
The Netherlands	Period	Sector
Incident 1: The Fipronil case	7/2017 - 4/2021 (Only have data from 2015 to 2020. Therefore, only results for 7/2017 to 12/2020)	Food safety (FS)
Incident 2: The Horsemeat case	1/2013-12/2017 (again only have data from start 2015. Therefore, start is 1/2015)	Food safety (FS)
Poland	Period	Sector
Incident 1: Co-operative Savings case	Not specified in methodology note, therefore, it is based only on incident relevant articles. - 3/2015 - 10/2019	Financial sector (FI)
Incident 2: Supervision Authority Leadership case	Same as above. 2/2018-12/2020	Financial sector (FI)



5.2 Switzerland

5.2.1 Incident 1: The BSI case (5/2016-12/2017)

The Swiss bank BSI (Banca della Svizzera Italiana) has been blamed for serious breaches of money laundering regulations through business relationships and several transactions linked to the corruption scandals surrounding the Malaysian wealth fund 1MDB. This is the outcome of enforcement proceedings launched by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA started in 2015. FINMA's main goal in supervising Swiss financial markets is to ensure that they function properly and that all clients of financial institutions are protected against their insolvency¹.

In the case of the BSI scandal, the bank executed numerous large transactions with unclear purpose over a period of several years and, despite suspicious indications, did not clarify the background of these transactions. Among other measures, FINMA has ordered the disgorgement of profits amounting to CHF 95 million. FINMA has also launched enforcement proceedings against two of the bank's former top managers².

This incident began when the regulator opened proceedings against BSI and sanctioned it due to the violation of regulations on money laundering. The consequence of the BSI's misconduct was that the bank was shut down and taken over by another bank (EFG International).

Some actors had criticised the behaviour of the Swiss financial regulator. An NGO criticised the Swiss regulator on the ground that, whereas it is claimed that Switzerland has among the best money laundering regulations, several banks still fail to comply with these rules.³ Other criticisms have been addressed to FINMA. For example, the Federal Administrative Court criticised FINMA on the amount confiscated to BSI which, according to the court, was not fully justified. However, it is difficult to talk about serious trust violations in the BSI case. Although some criticisms have been addressed to the regulator, it seems that this case has not brought a huge impact on the public opinion's trust in the Swiss financial regulator.

What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

The media were not considered as playing any significant role by the interviewed stakeholder. This interlocutor has mentioned that, although the BSI case was seen as involving a serious breach of money laundering, it was also perceived as a very technical issue which was not really of the citizens' interest. However, the number of interviews is too limited to draw a broader picture on the actual role of the media in this incident.

5.2.1.1 Content analysis of media coverage of the BSI case

Table 15 shows that there were 17 instances of either neutral, positive and/or negative coverage of the BSI incident, 10 of which were neutral in their coverage while the remaining seven articles were with negative coverage. It is possible for the same article to contain both positive and negative coverage, but not neutral and non-neutral coverage (i.e., negative, or positive). This means that the number of actual articles might be less than the sum of neutral, positive, and negative coverage, although not in this case because there is only neutral and negative coverage. The share of neutral (59 percent), negative (41 percent), and positive (none) coverage of the incident is shown in Figure 70.

Table 15. Number of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, or negative coverage for the BSI case in Switzerland

	Incident
Negative	7
Positive	0
Neutral	10

¹ <https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2016/05/20160524-mm-bsi/>

² <https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2016/05/20160524-mm-bsi/>

³ https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/follow-the-money_the-role-of-swiss-banks-in-the-1mdb-scandal/42316526






Figure 70. Share of incident specific articles with neutral, positive or negative coverage for the BSI case in Switzerland

Table 16 shows the number of articles with positive or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions; ability (A); benevolence (B); and integrity (I) before, during and after the incident. More than one trust-dimension can be covered in the same article. See Annex A6¹ for examples of the three trust-dimensions covered in news media articles. The table shows that the agency received a lot of negative coverage before the BSI incident, primarily in relation to its ability and benevolence. During the incident, no article included positive coverage of the three trust dimensions. The table also shows that the media coverage after the incident was more positive but also with some negative coverage regarding especially benevolence.

Table 16. Number of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the BSI case in Switzerland

	Before		Incident		After	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
A	3	12	0	3	7	2
B	1	14	0	7	8	5
I	1	7	0	1	3	2

Figure 71 shows the relative share of positive and negative coverage before, during and after the incident. As can be seen from the figure, the coverage was primarily negative before the incident, exclusively negative during the incident and more positive than negative after the incident.

¹ Available upon request.






Figure 71. Share of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the BSI case in Switzerland

Figure 72 shows which actors raised the negative opinions about the agency during the incident. The negative opinions came from three types of actors: experts (twice), regulatees (on six occasions) and the media (on four occasions).




Figure 72. Negative opinions voiced by different types of actors for the BSI case in Switzerland

Figure 73 shows the share of articles with a response from the agency to the media coverage of the incident. None of the articles contained a response from the agency.




Figure 73. Share of articles with a response from the agency for the BSI case in Switzerland

Figure 74 shows the different types of responses from the agency. In this case, there were no response.




Figure 74. Types of responses by the agency for the BSI case in Switzerland

5.2.1.2 Analysis of Regulatory Authorities and heads of regulatory agencies on Twitter during incident 1

Figure 75 shows the number of tweets by the regulatory authorities in the financial sector with the incident period marked with grey. The figure shows that there does not appear to have been a change in the volume of monthly tweets during the incident period relative to the period after the incident.




Figure 75. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the financial sector in the period 2015-2020, incident period marked with grey [Switzerland]

Note: Figure 75 only shows tweets from regulatory agencies in the Swiss financial sector, as the heads of regulatory authorities have not been active on Twitter in the period of interest.

5.2.2 Incident 2: The Covid app track "SwissCovid" case (3/2020-6/2020)

This case is about the creation of a Covid app tracking contacts during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Contact tracing identifies people who have had close contact with people who have been infected with the coronavirus. The SwissCovid app had the ambition to support this process, establishing whether close contact had taken place and giving rapid notification if there had been a risk of infection.

The involved agency was the data protection regulator, namely the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner, which supervises federal bodies, private bodies, advises private bodies and assists federal and cantonal authorities in the field of data protection, cooperates with data protection authorities in Switzerland and abroad. The agency falls under the supervision of the Federal office of Justice but enjoys formal autonomy.

This incident began before the Covid app ("SwissCovid") was released and continued after its release in 2020. The app was the result of joint efforts between the Federal Office of Public Health and the Federal Polytechnic of Lausanne (EPFL). The Covid Swiss task force was also in charge of supervising the development of this app (among other tasks).

Some concerns have been raised about the privacy of electronic data, in particular from the news media. The data protection regulator also raised some concerns regarding the protection of personal data while downloading and using the app. Since the Federal Data Protection Commissioner is in charge of supervising federal office activities with respect to data protection, it enquired about the release and the storage of



personal data in the long term. Then, the actors developing this app have regularly met with the regulator to clarify any potential issues related to personal data. After several meetings and enquiries, the Data Protection Commissioner confirmed that the SwissCovid app complied with data protection legislation.¹

Most part of the criticisms have been raised in the press and in the social media, echoing the concerns from several actors, such as cantonal protection authorities², the national regulator on data protection, and politicians from the right wing³ among others.

The incident has not ended in a specific moment. It is worth noting that only a limited part of the Swiss population downloaded and used this app (around 20% to 30%). Whereas the reasons are multiple, it is plausible to assume that the debate over the potential violation of personal data could have discouraged some citizens from using it.

What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

The interviewees perceived the news media as being generally incorrect in the way they communicated about the app and too focused on promoting a negative narrative about the app. The media were seen as misrepresenting the nature of the app despite the fact that the developer explained that there were no privacy violations, and that the regulator certified its full compliance with existent data protection regulations. However, other interviewees found the media to be more objective in their coverage of the case. Some stakeholders experienced that the media were very interested in the incident about the app and requested interviews or statements from the stakeholder on a daily basis. Such an interest is not surprising given the very high media attention towards the COVID-19 pandemic. The stakeholders adopted a media strategy of being as accessible and transparent as possible and also to communicate actively on social media. Against this background, some stakeholders report that they have lost trust in the media following their apparent misrepresentation of the incident about the app, e.g., by giving voice to an extreme minority and presenting a distorted image of the case.

5.2.2.1 Content analysis of media coverage of the “SwissCovid” case

Table 17 and Figure 76 show the number of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, and negative media coverage for the incident, as well as the share of, respectively, neutral, positive, and negative coverage. There were 10 neutral articles (77 percent), two articles with negative coverage (15 percent) and one article with positive coverage (8 percent).

Table 17. Number of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, or negative coverage for the “SwissCovid” case in Switzerland

	Incident
Negative	2
Positive	1
Neutral	10

¹ https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/en/home/latest-news/aktuell_news.html

² <https://www.letemps.ch/economie/swisscovid-feu-critiques-quatre-questions-comprendre>

³ https://www.swissinfo.ch/fre/politique/swisscovid_malgré-les-critiques--l-app-swisscovid-obtient-la-bénédiction-du-parlement-/45824310






Figure 76. Share of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, or negative coverage for the “SwissCovid” case in Switzerland

Table 18 shows the number of articles with positive or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions before, during and after the incident. There was almost no positive or negative coverage before the incident, two different dimensions with negative coverage during the incident, and four articles with negative coverage after the incident.

Table 18. Number of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the “SwissCovid” case in Switzerland

	Before		Incident		After	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
A	0	1	1	1	1	3
B	0	0	0	1	0	1
I	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: The period after the incident is less than a year (approx. six months).

Figure 77 shows the share of articles with positive or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions before, during and after the incident. The figure shows that while one trust-dimension was covered negatively before the incident, two dimensions were covered during the incident (with one dimension with both positive and negative coverage), and two dimensions (mainly negatively) covered after the incident.




Figure 77. Share of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after incident of trust violation for the “SwissCovid” case in Switzerland

Figure 78 shows that the negative opinions in the media coverage were raised by experts and by the regulatory authorities on data protection themselves.




Figure 78. Negative opinions voiced by different types of actors for the “SwissCovid” case in Switzerland

Figure 79 shows the share of articles with a response from the agency. The agency responded in 15 percent of the articles.




Figure 79. Share of articles with a response from the agency for the “SwissCovid” case in Switzerland

Figure 80 shows the types of responses by the agency. The agency’s response included amending actions, arguing shared responsibility and admission of the problem.




Figure 80. Types of responses by the agency for the “SwissCovid” case in Switzerland

5.2.2.2 Analysis of Regulatory Authorities and heads of regulatory agencies on Twitter during incident 2

Figure 81 shows the number of tweets by the regulatory agencies in the data protection sector with the incident period marked with grey. The figure shows that there appears to have been an increase in the number of tweets in the incident period, however, this is also the case for several other periods during the time of interest from 2015 to 2020.






Figure 81. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the data protection sector in the period 2015-2020, incident period marked with grey [Switzerland]

Note: Figure 81 only shows tweets from regulatory agencies in the Swiss data protection sector, as the heads of regulatory authorities have not been active on Twitter in the period of interest.

5.3 Belgium

5.3.1 Incident 1: The Optima case (6/2016 - 6/2017)

In 1991, Optima Financial Planners NV was founded to assist clients with their financial planning, inheritance and pensions. In addition, Optima Global Estate NV traded in real estate. In December 2011, Optima Financial Planners merged with the banking activities of Ethias bank and obtained its banking license; making Optima Bank a formal bank. Over a period of 10 years, several former politicians obtained a position in Optima Bank.

A special commissioner, appointed by the National Bank on 13 May 2016, asked the founder of Optima Bank by email on 6 June to transfer a statement of his private assets. The special commissioner wondered whether Optima was able to guarantee an orderly settlement of the bank's businesses. Around this time, it also became obvious that clients were withdrawing their money from the Bank, as they feared that the bank's bankruptcy and even board members withdrew money. In June 2016, the Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA) audited Optima Bank and its activities. Its balance sheet total had shrunk and on 8 June 2016 the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) blocked all accounts. On 9 June, also the insurance activities were shut down by the FSMA.

At the request of Optima bank itself, the bank was declared bankrupt by the Commercial Court of Ghent on 15 June 2016. The bankruptcy did not affect Optima Global Estate, which worked separately from the bank, but nevertheless the chair of Optima's real estate branch decided to give up his mandate.

The incident consists of two main critiques and trust violations. First, the CEO of Optima's activities criticised the National Bank of Belgium to have failed in their supervision of Optima Bank.

From 17 June 2016, the first criticisms towards the NBB also started to emerge. The governor of the NBB stated that irregularities at Optima came to light relatively late but argues that the main shareholder himself triggered the bankruptcy. According to the governor, the National Bank immediately sprang into action when



it came to light that money was being withdrawn from the accounts at an accelerated rate. In the days before the account was frozen, some members of the management still tried to carry out dubious transactions. Even on the day the revocation of the banking licence was requested, customers were called by Optima Bank to quickly move their money to another account.

In June 2016, it became clear that Optima's CEO would be the personal guarantor in the event of Optima's bankruptcy. The CEO fought this decision, but the National Bank persisted that it was the CEO's irregularities that led to the bankruptcy.

The CEO continued criticising the NBB for a longer period and argued that there were logical explanations for the withdrawal of money from the bank. The reduction of saving accounts was a deliberate strategy, and the fact that two board members withdrew 5,000 and 3,000 euros, respectively, from their private accounts was done because Optima's account was blocked by the regulator, so that the expenses could not be repaid. The CEO insisted that the NBB unlawfully and wrongly dealt with Optima Bank.

20 May 2017, it became public that Optima's CEO did not have a clean criminal record at the time of the takeover of Ethias Bank. The bank did not know about the CEO's conviction in Spain, which was not included in the Belgian files. As a result, the initial supervisor, the CBFA, refused to give the CEO the green light. The new supervisor, the National Bank, did eventually give its blessing. It is not clear whether the facts in Spain implied a professional ban for the CEO, but given the extent of the punishment, it seems almost impossible that the NBB could have given permission, had it been informed about it.

Besides the criticism on the NBB, there are also critiques coming from politicians about the involvement of politicians from the Flemish Socialist Party (sp.a) in the Optima Bank. These critiques were directed at the CEO of Optima banking division and the director of the National Bank when Optima received its banking licence. For the chairman of the sp.a party, the credibility of his party and of himself was at stake. The chair of sp.a defended the party.

Especially journalists were critical about the contacts between Optima's CEO and prominent national and local politicians, as well as municipalities and universities that had accounts with Optima Bank, and the national public transport company (NMBS). News media sketched the idea of a web of prominent figures within Belgian politics that all, in some way or another, dealt with Optima Bank. Besides some critical news coverage, these contacts with Optima Bank have had no real repercussions for sp.a politicians.

The incident ended with a series of lawsuits between the NBB and the CEO of Optima. The NBB forced the CEO to be a guarantor for the bankruptcy, meaning that his own personal finances can be used to pay back the creditors of the bank. Optima's CEO wanted to prevent this and insisted in court that he had been mistreated by the NBB. By March 2018, he had lost all these lawsuits and became guarantor. After these lawsuits the media storm around the Optima Bank case quieted down.

Although the NBB faced critiques from the CEO and the news media, it seems that they did not experience any sanctions nor rewards for their course of action during the incidents.

What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

The media were unable to sketch a complete picture of the case, as part of the case was confidential. An interviewee (BEFIRA5) highlighted that the National Bank of Belgium could not disclose much information, as there was an ongoing judicial investigation. The National Bank has very strict rules about what information they can disclose, and as a result, journalists were only able to cover one-sided information. Hence, the interviewee did not see any fake news, only incomplete news. The interviewee (BEFIRA5) expressed that this can sometimes be frustrating for the own organisation and its managers, as they would like to tell their part of the story. They were able to do so in parliamentary hearings as well as in court. The interviewee (BEFIRA5) mentioned that they have a good relationship with journalists and use media to communicate their positions. They highlighted that journalists are interested in what they have to communicate and they believe that journalists are objectively reporting the information they have at their disposal. They added that they do not perceive the media as a threat for their operations, but that the media are just doing their job.



5.3.1.1 Content analysis of media coverage of the Optima case

Table 19 and Figure 82 shows the number of incident specific articles with positive or negative coverage for the incident, as well as the share of positive and negative coverage. There were 50 articles with neutral coverage regarding the incident (76 percent), 15 articles with negative coverage (23 percent) and one article with positive coverage (1 percent).

Table 19. Number of incident specific articles with positive, negative, or neutral coverage for the Optima case in Belgium

	Incident
Negative	15
Positive	1
Neutral	50




Figure 82. Share of incident specific articles with positive, negative or neutral coverage for the Optima case in Belgium

Table 20 shows the number of articles with positive and/or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions before, during and after the incident. The table shows that the three dimensions were neither covered positively or negatively before and after the incident, but only during the incident and mainly negatively in relation to the ability-dimension.

Table 20. Number of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the Optima case in Belgium

	Before		Incident		After	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
A	0	0	1	11	0	0
B	0	0	0	1	0	0
I	0	0	0	6	0	0

Figure 83 shows that the share of articles with positive and negative coverage was connected to the period during the incident and almost exclusively in the form of negative coverage.






Figure 83. Share of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the Optima case in Belgium

Figure 84 shows that the negative opinions were voiced by different actors, and particularly by regulatees.




Figure 84. Negative opinions voiced by different types of actors for the Optima case in Belgium

Figure 85 shows the share of articles in which the agency responds to the opinions raised in the articles covering the incident. The agency responds in 2 percent of the articles.






Figure 85. Share of articles with a response from the agency for the Optima case in Belgium

Figure 86 shows the types of responses by the agency. The agency responds twice with justifications, and once with, respectively, arguments of shared responsibility, problem denial and silence despite being asked to respond.




Figure 86. Types of responses by the agency for the Optima case in Belgium

5.3.1.2 Analysis of Regulatory Authorities and heads of regulatory agencies on Twitter during incident 1

Figure 87 shows the number of tweets by the regulatory agencies in the financial sector with the incident period marked with grey. The figure shows a decline in the number of tweets during the incident period.






Figure 87. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the financial sector in the period 2015-2020, incident period marked with grey [Belgium]

Note: Figure 87 only shows tweets from regulatory agencies in the Belgian financial sector, as the heads of regulatory authorities have not been active on Twitter in the period of interest.

5.3.2 Incident 2: The Fipronil/Veviba case (7/2017 - 12/2018)

On 9 May 2017, an egg processing company in Sint-Niklaas, East Flanders, found fipronil in a shipment of eggs after an auto-control. The FASFC and the Public Prosecutor of Antwerp were informed. On 3 June, the FASFC sent samples of sampled eggs to a Dutch laboratory to test which substances were present in the samples and whether they were compliant. On 6 June, the FASFC questioned the contaminated farm to find out the source of contamination. At that moment, there were two hypothesised sources of the contamination: the animal feed or a pesticide against blood lice and a parasite on chickens. On 7 June, the FASFC seized the eggs that had been blocked in a packaging station since 3 June.

On 14 June, the FASFC received the latest results of its lab tests, and the eggs from the poultry companies whose results were compliant were released, the others were destroyed. The European safety threshold or Acute Reference Dose (ARfD) had not been reached, and thus a complete recall was not necessary. Only when the last tests were compliant, the poultry companies could resume their production. The FASFC reacted immediately at the first notification and took measures to block production and to trace the eggs that had left the farm. After an investigation, the FASFC was able to establish a link with a Dutch operator and submitted the dossier to its national investigation unit on 15 June.

On 19 June, it became known that a Dutch company was involved in the scandal. The FASFC contacted the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) and asked a series of questions. These included a list of Belgian customers of the Dutch company ChickFriend, which, together with the Belgian company Poultry-Vision, is suspected of being the hub of the scandal. These companies use the anti-blood lice product 'Dega-16'. Later, it appeared that the product did contain fipronil instead of Dega-16, and was repackaged by ChickFriend (CF). After not having received any answers to the questions of 19, 26 and 28 June, the FASFC sent an official request to the Netherlands on 6 July via the European cooperation mechanism AAC-FF against food fraud, in order to obtain information and the list of customers of the Dutch company ChickFriend.



On 13 July, the FASFC knew that there was probably a large-scale fraud. That day, a criminal investigation was opened in the Netherlands. It would be another week before Belgium raised the alarm with Europe.

On 19 July, Poultry-Vision was searched. The company supplied the cleaning agent Dega-16 to chicken farms. Poultry-Vision would have added Fipronil to that product, even though it is a prohibited insecticide. In the Netherlands, ChickFriend was searched. One day later, on July 20, there was a breakthrough in the investigation, and it became clear that many more companies might have been contaminated.

In the Netherlands, seven companies had to close down, but according to the NVWA, there was no danger to public health. The FASFC did not withdraw any products from the food chain.

On 25 July, the FASFC temporarily closed a number of Flemish egg producers following the discovery of the insecticide fipronil in their eggs. Yet again it was emphasised that there was no danger to public health. It was also revealed that toxic cleaning products for chicken houses had been delivered in Germany, Poland, England and France.

31 July, the FASFC blocked 86 Belgian poultry farms, including 48 farms with laying hens. The other companies are breeding farms and nurseries. All of them were suspected to have been in contact with Poultry-Vision and ChickFriend. The FASFC was investigating whether there was too much fipronil in the eggs of the farms. As long as there was no clarity about this, they were forbidden to sell the eggs. Their products were removed from the supermarket shelves.

On 1 August, searches were conducted in a warehouse in Baarle-Hertog, owned by the manager of Poultry-Vision. The FASFC found 6,000 litres of fipronil and stated that there were no contaminated eggs in Belgium.

On 3 August, the first results of the tests came back and showed acceptable levels of fipronil. According to the FASFC, consumers could buy eggs in the shops and eat them with peace of mind. The blocked companies would probably remain closed for a while. If Fipronil was found, all eggs had to be destroyed.

The criticism towards the FASFC was coming from two directions: politicians on the one hand, and news media on the other.

Only on 5 August, confusion arose regarding the amount of Fipronil found per egg. It seemed that the FASFC worked with higher limit values than other European regulators. This led to criticism from national politicians who wondered why the FASFC was not transparent about its tests and working methods. Both the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Public Health were in the line of fire. As a response, the Minister of Agriculture called the FASFC to explain themselves and demanded clarification of the working methods of the agency¹.

On 8 August, the FASFC reported that excess fipronil levels had been found in eggs of a specific company. A ministerial crisis meeting followed between the ministers of Agriculture, Public Health and Consumer Affairs. It was decided that extra precautionary measures would be taken: a helpline was set up for citizens, and all companies under investigation would have to recall their eggs. Moreover, they declared that the FASFC was doing as they were supposed to and did not make any mistakes.

On 9 August, there was a special session of the Parliamentary Commission on Economy and Agriculture and the Parliamentary Commission on Public Health. Accusations against the Netherlands were made which was said to withhold important information.² The Minister of Agriculture argues that the Netherlands knew that there was fipronil fraud since 2016. Both the Minister of Agriculture and of Public Health persisted that there was never any danger to public health.

¹ De Tijd (08-08-2017)

<https://www.tijd.be/tablet/newspaper/vooraan/minister-roept-voedselagentschap-op-matje/9920924.html>

² De Morgen. 10/08/2017, 12/08/2017



What followed was criticism targeted at the FASFC and its slow and non-transparent procedures as well as the ministers' disclaim of responsibilities. There were also critiques of the working method of the FAVV, who considered low fipronil values as not being dangerous, despite the fact that this substance should not be in eggs in the first place. Additionally, in the Netherlands there were questions from politicians regarding how the Dutch government acted. It withheld information as a criminal investigation was ongoing. Because of this, the information could not be shared with other parties.

After 10 August, Fipronil was also found in the eggs of private poultry farmers, and on 21 August, products containing egg were withdrawn from the shelves. The FASFC also checked restaurants and shops.

The incident, and more specifically the criticism directed at the FASFC, ended when it became clear that fipronil was detected in egg companies all over Europe. The FASFC used this fact to defend themselves by stating that they were able to detect the fraud, whereas other agencies in Europe were not able to (also see BEFSRA1). Moreover, they stated that their lack of communication was due to a judicial investigation going on at the moment, which limited their ways of communicating to politicians as well as citizens.

On 14 July 2018, the media storm had completely blown over, because the FASFC announced that no more Fipronil was found in Belgian eggs. The FASFC had collected 400 samples and all of them were safe.

Roughly parallel with the Fipronil incident, the FASFC was involved in an incident regarding a company called Veviba, which falsified labels in order to sell overdue meat products. The Veviba incident actually took its offset before Fipronil, beginning in September 2016 when a lorry arrived in Kosovo carrying meat from the Veviba company located in Bastogne. Most of the labels had been torn off the packages, but remnants of them showed that the meat dated back to 2004. On 30 September 2016, the FASFC received a report from Kosovo about the falsified labels on meat from the Veviba slaughterhouse. Three days later the FASFC sent inspectors to Kosovo to establish fraud and visited Veviba. On 30 November 2016, the FASFC drew up an official report for the fraud identified. Later, on 30 January 2017, a new official report was drawn up. The investigation proceeded slowly and on 10 March, the FASFC asked the public prosecutor of Neufchâteau to speed up the investigation of Veviba and other dossiers passed on by the FASFC. This was one day after fipronil was discovered during an auto-control of the egg processing company in East Flanders.

On 9 November 2017 the FASFC received information on possible social fraud at Veviba, which worked with dozens of posted workers. Following this report, the public prosecutor's office and the FAVV carried out a number of house searches on 28 February 2018. The investigators did not find any undeclared workers but did come across a case of 'date fraud' in which meat products were intentionally labelled wrongly. There was a problem with the labelling of 138 pallets. Older meat parcels had a new label with a more recent date on it. Because it concerned frozen meat, there was no real danger for public health according to the FASFC. The meat was said to be mainly destined for foreign countries. As a result of this fraud, products were taken off the market and there was a recall operation. Additionally, the companies under Verbist group, the holding which Veviba was part of, were suspended.

The first criticism on the FASFC started during an emergency session of the Parliamentary Commission on Public Health on 12 March 2018. Politicians asked why there had been a year and a half between the first report from Kosovo in October 2016 and the discovery of fraud at Veviba. According to FASFC's head after the report from Kosovo of possible fraud with Veviba meat, there was indeed a response. "An inspector established labelling fraud on the spot and then passed the file on to the public prosecutor," says the head of the FASFC. Once an investigating judge is in charge, the FASFC cannot intervene. The Minister of Agriculture called for stricter control in order to tackle this type of fraud better and, above all, faster. The FASFC is also supported by the Minister of Economy and Consumer Affairs¹.

On 22 March, the Minister of Agriculture announced additional measures. The slaughterhouses, cutting plants and cold stores in Belgium were to be controlled more often, with thousands of extra unannounced

¹ De Standaard (12-03-2018) https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20180311_03403798



inspections from the FASFC. The general consensus was that the FASFC did not have enough capacity to control and inspect slaughterhouses.

On 28 March, criticism arose on the intertwining of the employees of the FASFC and the meat sector. The Green Party called for a cooling-off period for former FASFC employees¹.

On 12 June 2018, Group Verbist denied all allegations of the FASFC and accused the Minister of Agriculture of abuse of power. The group threatened with legal action. The interim managers of the Veviba slaughterhouse accused of fraud distanced themselves from Veviba's owner. The latter had heavily criticised the food agency FASFC and the Minister of Agriculture.

Although the FAFSC faced serious critiques during this incident, they were not punished. Instead, the consensus among politicians seemed to be that the agency did as much as it could considering the judicial investigations and the resources they had. The FAFSC was rewarded, however, on 12 April 2018, it was announced that the FASFC would receive an additional 2 million euro in funding to strengthen their anti-fraud cell through more staff and more controls.

What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

The media were seen by the regulator and stakeholders as trying to amplify the magnitude of the incident to sell more papers, hence creating a panic which was probably not called for. The media were seen as creating undue criticism of both the regulator and the sector as such. Certain stakeholders tried to address the false claims, they perceived, as being propagated by the media, using active strategies to inform the way the case was covered in the media. The criticisms raised in regular media were echoed on social media, however, the importance of social media were experienced differently between respondents. The regulator felt a loss of trust from consumers which was fuelled by the criticism raised in the media.

5.3.2.1 Content analysis of media coverage of the Fipronil/Veviba case

Table 21 and Figure 88 show the number of incident specific articles with positive or negative coverage for the incident, as well as the share of positive and negative coverage. There were 59 articles with negative coverage (62 percent), 35 articles with neutral coverage (36 percent), and 2 articles with positive coverage (2 percent).

Table 21. Number of incident specific articles with positive, negative, or neutral coverage for the Fipronil/Veviba case in Belgium

	Incident
Negative	59
Positive	2
Neutral	35

¹ De Standaard (18-03-2018) https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20180327_03433299

De Standaard (12-04-2018) https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20180411_03458712






Figure 88. Share of incident specific articles with positive or negative coverage for the Fipronil/Veviba case in Belgium

Table 22 shows the number of articles with positive or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions before, during and after the incident. The table shows that there was very little positive and/or negative coverage before the incident. After the incident, there was a bit more articles with both positive and negative coverage. During the incident there was especially negative coverage of the ability-dimension.

Table 22. Number of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the Fipronil/Veviba case in Belgium

	Before		Incident		After	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
A	1	1	3	44	3	4
B	0	0	0	11	0	0
I	0	1	0	17	0	0

Figure 89 shows the share of articles with positive or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions before, during and after the incident. Before the incident there were 75 percent negative and 25 percent positive coverage, and after the incident the coverage was 50/50 percent. During the coverage the share of negative coverage was almost exclusively negative.






Figure 89. Share of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the Fipronil/Veviba case in Belgium

Figure 90 shows that the negative opinions were voiced by different actors, and particularly by political/legislative actors with more than 30 negative opinions raised. The ombudsman raised more than 10 negative opinions.




Figure 90. Negative opinions voiced by different types of actors for the Fipronil/Veviba case in Belgium

Figure 91 shows the share of articles with a response from the agency to the opinions raised. 31 percent of the articles included a response from the agency.






Figure 91. Share of articles with a response from the agency for the Fipronil/Veviba case in Belgium

Figure 92 shows the types of responses from the agency in the media coverage for the incident. The agency used seven different types of responses, primarily justifications (17 times) and blame shifting (15 times).




Figure 92. Types of responses by the agency for the Fipronil/Veviba case in Belgium

5.3.2.2 Analysis of Regulatory Authorities and heads of regulatory agencies on Twitter during incident 2

Figure 93 shows the number of tweets by the regulatory agencies in the food safety sector with the incident period marked with grey. The figure shows that there are periods with spikes in number of tweets during the incident. The spikes occur at the beginning of the incident period, in the middle of the incident period and at the end of the incident period.






Figure 93. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the food sector in the period 2015-2020, incident period marked with grey [Belgium]

Note: Figure only shows tweets from regulatory agencies in the Belgian food sector, as the heads of regulatory authorities have not been active on Twitter in the period of interest.

5.4 Spain

5.4.1 Incident 1: The Data Protection case (2/2017 - 5/2018)

The Spanish Agency for Data Protection (AEPD) is the state independent control authority in charge of ensuring compliance with data protection regulations. It was founded in 1992. The headquarters are located in Madrid and its scope of action extends to the whole of Spain. The main objective of the AEPD is to ensure compliance with data protection legislation by those responsible for the files (public entities, private companies, associations, etc.) and to control its applications guaranteeing fundamental rights in the protection of the citizens' personal data. The AEPD carries out its investigative powers fundamentally at the request of citizens, although, it is also empowered to act ex officio. The agency is statutory and hierarchically independent and is related to the Government through the Ministry of Justice. The representation of the agency is held by its president who, with a mandate of five years (renewable for five years more) must exercise his functions with full independence and objectivity, without being subject to any instructions in the exercise of his functions. The President of the Spanish Data Protection Agency is advised by a Consultative Council. The General Registry of Data Protection, the Data Inspection, and the General Secretariat of the agency report hierarchically to the President of the agency. The acts dictated by the director (on behalf of the agency) exhaust the administrative channel and against them, only an optional appeal for reconsideration can be filed before the AEPD itself or a contentious-administrative appeal before the National High Court.

The AEPD sanctioned, respectively, Òmnium Cultural and the Catalan national Assembly (ANC,) two Catalan pro-independence cultural and political organisations, for data handling during two episodes. On the one hand, before a pro-independence consultation to the population held in Catalonia in November 2014, Òmnium Cultural made a survey asking about the citizens' opinion and was accused of personnel data mismanagement. On the second hand, Òmnium was accused of having personal data stored in an enterprise in USA. These sanctions were controversial in the sense that Òmnium and ANC considered the AEPD to



impose higher penalties against them for political reasons, while they were much more permissive in other cases, for which reason an issue was made about the political neutrality of the AEPD.

On the 20 November 2015, the AEPD imposed a fine of each 200,000 euros on the ANC and Òmnium Cultural for violating an article of the Organic Law on Data Protection (LOPD). The complaint was filed by the right-wing Spanish-nationalist political parties VOX and Ciutadans. In its resolution, the AEPD considers that the ANC and Òmnium failed to comply with the regulations that establish that the respondent must give their "consent expressly and in writing" for the "processing of data of a personal nature that reveal ideology, union affiliation, religion, and beliefs". In addition, the ANC was sanctioned with another 40,000 euros for not complying with the security of the personal data contained in its files since they were leaked. The affected considered the sanctions had been unjust and political/ideological. In a statement, Òmnium detailed that the penalty for the use of data was 200,000 euros, to which was added a surcharge of 40,000 euros for not having made the payment beforehand.

In March 2017, The Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD) again fined the Catalan National Assembly and Òmnium with 90,000 euros for having an inoperative database in the United States.

The last sanction occurred when the new international protocol on data was being defined. The AEPD did not make any statements in this regard. The association that leads Jordi Cuixart assured that he had refused to pay the fine imposed on him for considering it a "disproportionate political attack", since the regulation that the fine was based on was very recent, and many companies were readjusting to the new norm, that they should have been allowed to have a reasonable period of time to adjust their data policy. Òmnium Cultural denounced that "this is an example of political persecution, of repression of dissidence. It is a fine application with ideological criteria".

In 2019, the National Court ratified the decision of the AEPD, and Omnium and the Catalan National Assembly were sanctioned. After that, The Constitutional Tribunal also dismissed Omnium's appeal against the AEPD's fine.

What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

One central stakeholder has been interviewed regarding his/her perceptions of the role of the media in relation to the incident. The stakeholder perceived that national Spanish medias had a political agenda and were biased in their presentation of the incident while Catalan medias attempted to present the incident objectively and neutrally, reproducing the statements of the ANC and Omnium. The stakeholder explained that their organisations had a media strategy of total transparency in their communication. Some stakeholders perceived that the agency (AEPD) was generally discredited on social media for this "biased" sanctioning policy.

5.4.1.1 Content analysis of media coverage of the data protection case

Table 23 and Figure 94 show the number of incident specific articles with positive or negative coverage for the incident, as well as the share of positive and negative coverage. There were 5 articles with negative coverage (100 percent) and no articles with positive or neutral coverage.

Table 23. Number of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, or negative coverage for the Data protection case in Spain

	Incident
Negative	5
Positive	0
Neutral	0






Figure 94. Share of incident specific articles with positive or negative coverage for the Data protection case in Spain

Table 24 shows the number of articles with positive or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions before, during and after the incident. There was no negative or positive coverage before the incident, four articles with negative coverage of benevolence and three articles with negative coverage of integrity during the incident. After the incident, there was both positive and negative coverage.

Table 24. Number of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the Data protection case in Spain

	Before		Incident		After	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
A	0	0	0	0	4	2
B	0	0	0	4	0	0
I	0	0	0	3	0	1

Figure 95 shows the share of articles with negative or positive coverage of the trust-dimensions before, during and after the incident. The figure shows that negative coverage only occurred during and after the incident, but also that the ability-dimension had a share of 67 percent positive coverage after the incident.






Figure 95. Share of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the Data protection case in Spain

Figure 96 shows that the negative opinions were voiced by interest organisations (five times) and by political/legislative actors (four times).




Figure 96. Negative opinions voiced by different types of actors for the Data protection case in Spain

Figure 97 and 98 show the share of articles with a response from the agency as well as the type of response. None of the articles had a response from the agency.






Figure 97. Share of articles with a response from the agency for the Data protection case in Spain




Figure 98. Types of responses by the agency for the Data protection case in Spain

5.4.1.2 Analysis of Regulatory Authorities and heads of regulatory agencies on Twitter during incident 1

Figure 99 shows the number of tweets by the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the data protection sector with the incident period marked with grey. The figure shows that around the middle of the incident period there is a spike in the number of tweets, and that the number of monthly tweets peaks at the end of the incident period. The heads of the regulatory authorities are inactive during the incident period.






Figure 99. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the data protection sector in the period 2015-2020, incident period marked with grey [Spain]

5.4.2 Incident 2: The Banco Popular's resolution case (6/2017 - 4/2018)

The Bank of Spain (Banco de España) is the national central bank and the supervisor of the Spanish banking system together with the European Central Bank. The Bank of Spain was founded in Madrid in 1782, and its activity is regulated by the Law of Autonomy of the Bank of Spain (1994). The Autonomy Law establishes that the Banco de España is an integral part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and, as such, is subject to the provisions of the Treaty of the European Community and the Statute of the ESCB. Thus, in the exercise of the functions that derive from its condition as an integral part of the ESCB, the Bank of Spain complies with the guidelines and instructions of the European Central Bank.

Since 1 January, 1999, the Banco de España has participated in the development of the basic functions attributed to the European System of Central Banks, such as to define and execute the monetary policy of the eurozone, to maintain inflation stability, currency exchange operations, own and manage the official foreign exchange reserves of the State, promote the proper functioning of payment systems in the euro area, among others. On top, the Bank of Spain also carries out a number of other tasks typically ascribed to a central bank, such as oversight of the financial system and management of the foreign exchange reserves.

The Bank of Spain's Executive Commission is formed by the Governor of the Bank of Spain, who is appointed by the King at the proposal of the President of the Government of Spain, from among those who are Spanish and have recognised competence in monetary or banking matters.

In this incident, the Bank of Spain was blamed for not having supervised closely enough, and its closeness with banks led to blind spots which allowed banks to present fictitious accounts. The secretary of the Association of Inspectors of the Bank of Spain, José Antonio Delgado Manzanares, propounded in the Congress of Deputies the harshest criticism, known to date, on the actions of the Bank of Spain and the ECB. Throughout his speech at the financial crisis investigation commission, Delgado pointed out that, at the time of the bank mergers, the supervision allowed almost all savings banks to file "fictitious profits" although they had "losses in the millions that would have prevented them" from carrying out the unions. He claimed that "the Bank of Spain had tools to stop crisis but did not want to do so".



The Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the moment of the incident, Luis María Linde, during his appearance at the Economy Commission congress, defended that the institution neither was a supervisor, nor did it have decision-making power in the resolution of the entity, which was facing critical liquidity problems and was auctioned and bought by Santander for one euro. Since November 2014, Linde has recalled that the Bank of Spain is not the supervisor of the financial entities, whose supervisor is the European Central Bank (ECB), which depends on the Mecanismo Único de Resolución (MUR).

Likewise, it is not a "resolution authority" that competence corresponds to the Single Resolution Board. He added that the Bank of Spain "does not even participate in these meetings, other than as an observer." It highlights that the Bank of Spain is not even on the Board of the MUR. Moreover, the Single Supervisor Mechanism (SSM), also based in Frankfurt, oversees the supervision of the bigger banks in Spain, including Banco Popular.

Those affected by the resolution of the bank (particularly shareholders that lost all the value of their shares) were very active in placing demands in the courts to ask for a compensation, disputing the loss of value of the Popular Bank and blaming the regulator to be excessively interventionist and risk-adverse. Later, the Court ruled that the Bank of Spain did not have the competencies, thus was not to blame. After that, getting information on the details of the resolution of the Banco Popular has become very difficult. Linde affirmed in the Congress that the ECB did not let them give information regarding the figures and accounts of the Banco Popular.

What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

The media were perceived as having different reactions to the incident; some media outlets were very alarmist, while others did not give that much attention to the incident. Some stakeholders did not communicate about the incident unless asked specifically about it during, e.g., a press conference, and generally this stakeholder expressed that their organisation was not concerned about comments or reactions from the media. The communication was mediated in a way that affected the stock market the least possible.

5.4.2.1 Content analysis of media coverage of the Banco Popular's resolution case

Table 25 and Figure 100 show the number of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, or negative coverage for the incident, as well as the share of neutral, positive, and negative coverage. There were 2 articles with negative coverage (100 percent) and no articles with positive or neutral coverage.

Table 25. Number of incident specific articles with neutral, positive or negative coverage for the Banco Popular's resolution case in Spain

	Incident
Negative	2
Positive	0
Neutral	0






Figure 100. Share of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, or negative coverage for the Banco Popular's resolution case in Spain

Table 26 shows that the agency had both negative and positive media coverage of all three trust-dimensions before and after the incident, with more negative than positive coverage. During the incident, there was one article with negative coverage of the ability-dimension and one article with negative coverage of the integrity-dimension.

Table 26. Number of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the Banco Popular's resolution case in Spain

	Before		Incident		After	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
A	3	7	0	1	3	10
B	1	2	0	0	1	3
I	1	3	0	1	0	5

Figure 101 shows the share of articles with positive and negative coverage of the dimensions before, during and after the incident. Before the incident, the positive coverage of the articles was approx. 30 percent, during the incident the coverage was exclusively negative, and after the incident the share of positive coverage had decreased a bit compared to before for incident.






Figure 101. Share of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the Banco Popular's resolution case in Spain

Figure 102 shows that the negative opinions were voiced once by political/legislative actors and once by the media.




Figure 102. Negative opinions voiced by different types of actors for the Banco Popular's resolution case in Spain

Figures 103 and 104 show the share of articles with a response from the agency as well as the type of response. None of the articles had a response from the agency.




Figure 103. Share of articles with a response from the agency for the Banco Popular's resolution case in Spain




Figure 104. Types of responses by the agency for the Banco Popular's resolution case in Spain

5.4.2.2 Analysis of Regulatory Authorities and heads of regulatory agencies on Twitter during incident 2

Figure 105 shows the number of tweets by the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the financial sector with the incident period marked with grey. The figure shows that the number of tweets from the regulatory authorities appears relatively stable throughout the whole incident period except for one month where there was a slight dip. The heads of the regulatory authorities were not active during the incident period.




Figure 105. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the financial sector in the period 2015-2020, incident period marked with grey [Spain]

5.5 Israel

5.5.1 Incident 1: The GodTV case

The incident happened due to a miscommunication between GodTV (a messianic TV channel), the broadcasting platform (Hot) and the regulatory committee, Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Council (המועצה לשידורי כבלים ולווין). The core task of the regulatory committee is to oversee the broadcasts of “Yes” and “Hot”, the two main TV broadcasters as well as multiple other smaller channels like the parliament’s tv channel. The committee works under the Israeli Ministry of Communication. To clarify, the Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Council does not work directly with TV channels but with broadcasters themselves.

In 2020, one of Israel’s major broadcasters, Hot, was given permission to broadcast GodTV, after asking for a license from the regulatory agency. After GodTV started broadcasting, the regulatory agency watched their content and claimed that the paperwork that was handed in by Hot was misleading. As proselytising to minors is illegal in Israel, the accuracy of the paperwork relating to the channel was highly relevant for the licensing process. Therefore, the regulatory committee canceled the license and asked Hot to send a new request which would reflect GodTV’s broadcasting plans, including a desire to proselytise or, generally, broadcast religious content. GodTV, however, insisted that the initial request sent by Hot accurately described their content.

On this basis, GodTV started criticising the government for trying to silence them. However, other media outlets largely sided with the regulatory agency and agreed with the criticism of the channel. That is, many felt that GodTV’s content was inappropriate and that the regulatory agency should have done a better job at noticing their content. This public outcry led to a civilian-led boycott of the broadcaster (Hot).

This incident concluded with Hot canceling its contact with GodTV. Although we do not have any official data of this, some of our interviewees suggested that the civilian-led boycott against Hot might have encouraged this. GodTV did not return to broadcast with Hot, so no additional request to the regulatory agency was made. Throughout the entire incident the regulatory agency continued to insist that the channel and broadcaster had misled them.



What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

A representative from GodTV felt that international media had allowed them to mobilise support, particularly through social media. They viewed national media as less involved. Domestically, some news outlets were perceived by the agency to give an accurate description of the incident, but stakeholders generally perceived media outlets to follow their own specific agendas either agreeing or disagreeing with the policy objectives behind the decision to deny GodTV a licence.

5.5.2 Incident 2: The Al Jazeera case

The incident is divided into two main issues. First, the Minister of Communication's declaration of intention to close Al Jazeera's channel in Israel. Second, the Government Press Office (לשכת העיתונות הממשלתית) (GPO) started an investigation of the Al Jazeera journalist, Elias Karam, regarding a remark made by him 2 years prior that was considered as incitement.

The GPO works to facilitate media coverage of key elements in Israel, state visits and the visits of other foreign VIPs. The GPO issues press cards for permanently stationed and visiting journalists, as well as a range of cards for other media personnel (broadcast technicians, documentary film producers, media assistants, etc.). The GPO offers media representatives a sophisticated briefing room, television studio and professional support materials. In addition, the GPO is responsible for opening communication centers for important events such as papal and US presidential visits. The GPO is equipped to operate in Hebrew, Arabic, English and Russian. A separate department takes care of the economic press. The GPO forwards a daily summary of articles about Israel in the English overseas press to various Government offices. The GPO is responsible for translating and distributing press releases from the Prime Minister's Office, the President's Office and other government agencies.

The incident started around 2015 when Elias Karam, Al Jazeera's head journalist in Israel, was interviewed abroad and he declared his support for the Palestinian resistance towards the Israeli occupiers. Two years later, he was investigated due to that comment, and his license as an Israeli journalist was at risk. At the same time, the Israeli communication minister declared publicly of his intention to close Al Jazeera's channel in Israel.

On the one hand, the political statement of intent to close Al Jazeera spoke to one part of the Israeli public (right wing), who agreed with the ambition to combat Al Jazeera's presence in Israel. However, another smaller part of Israeli society (left wing) was critical of the threat to the individual journalist's credentials and criticised the GPO and the communication minister's actions.

As the communications minister's declaration was merely political, there was no follow-up. As for the journalist, after a hearing within the GPO office, and the interference of the Israeli Journalists Organization, it ended with a warning instead of revoking the journalists' credentials. There was an informal sanction in the form of erasing Al Jazeera members from the Prime Minister's spokesman for Arab themes list, and a prohibition to enter or interview the Prime Minister's press conferences.

What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

The regulator perceives the media in this case to work in unison to promote freedom of speech without attention to alternative – and according to the legislator- legitimate aims such as the survival of the state. Stakeholders experienced a more divided media picture with some medias working for the Al Jazeera journalist while others supported the line of the government. The media were seen as active political players in the incident representing different views.



5.6 Denmark

5.6.1 Incident 1: The whitewashing case (3/2017 - 5/2019)

The incident involved a case of suspected money laundering from Danske Bank's, now closed, branch in Estonia, where the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority was critiqued in relation to their money laundering control. Danske Bank is the largest bank in Denmark but has also branches in several other countries, primarily within Europe.

In 2006, Danske Bank bought the Finnish bank "Sampo Bank" for 30 billion DKK, and included in the deal was the Estonian branch. A year later, in 2007, the bank receives a warning from the Estonian financial regulator concerning suspicious clients of the Estonian branch. In 2012, the Estonian financial regulator contacts the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority in relation to issues regarding the control with potential money laundering.

In 2013, a whistle-blower (who later turned out to be a former manager in the bank's Estonian branch) wrote directly to Danske Bank's Executive Board and warned them of clear breaches of the money laundering regulation occurring in the Estonian branch.

The revelation of the incident began in 2017 when the newspaper 'Berlingske' began uncovering one of the biggest banking scandals in Danish history; the case of whitewashing in Danske Bank's Estonian branch. According to Berlingske, 140 billion DKK was illegally taken out of Russia between 2010 and 2014 to be washed or laundered in several banks, e.g., the Estonian branch of Danske Bank where 1500 transactions worth approx. seven billion DKK were conducted. Later, the newspaper disclosed how the regime in Azerbaijan used accounts to channel billions through the branch in Estonia to, e.g., European politicians, government officials, and tax havens. According to the whistle-blower, mentioned earlier, the Russian intelligence service, FSB, and family of the Russian President Putin controlled a group of companies with accounts in the Estonian branch. Other suspicious clients included former Ukrainian president Viktor Janukovitj, a company involved in North Korean arms trade, and a professional money launderer, who has been linked to, e.g., terrorist groups and Mexican mafia cartels¹.

In 2018, it was announced that the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority was conducting an investigation of the suspected irregularities. However, before the investigation began the chairman of the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority had to declare himself incompetent, because he had been CFO and a member of the Board of Executives in Danske Bank with supreme responsibility for the bank's money laundering control while the suspicious transactions in the Estonian branch took place².

The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority published the results of their investigation on 3 May 2018, where they heavily criticised Dansk Bank's handling of the whitewashing case. The Supervisory Authorities also presented a catalogue of 23 suggestions to improve the whitewashing oversight and the authority in general. As a result of the investigation, the chairman of the board of the Financial Supervisory Authority resigned because of his former position as CFO in Danske Bank and his role as responsible for the Danske Bank's compliance with money laundering regulation³.

On 19 September 2018, Danske Bank published a report conducted by the law firm Bruun & Hjejle at a historic press conference where the bank revealed numerous failures in their internal control with whitewashing. The CEO in Dansk Bank resigned during the press conference, and later the chairman of the board also left the bank following a direct request from the company 'A. P. Møller', a major shareholder.

Later in the fall, the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority refused to approve the bank's preferred – and internal - candidate as the new CEO of Danske Bank, and the bank was forced to find an external replacement.

¹ <https://www.berlingske.dk/virksomheder/overblik-saa-vidtraekkende-er-hvidvaskskandalen-i-danske-bank>

² <https://jv.dk/artikel/overblik-tidslinje-over-danske-banks-hvidvask-sag-2021-4-29>

³ <https://www.berlingske.dk/virksomheder/formand-for-finanstilsynet-traekker-sig-efter-hvidvask-sag>



In February 2019, the Estonian financial regulator gave Danske Bank injunctions to cease its banking activities in Estonia. Danske Bank then closed their Estonian branch the following year.

In March 2019, the State Prosecutor for Special Crime charged Danske Bank and nine former or current employees/managers from the bank in relation to the suspected money laundering. However, in January and March 2021 the charges were dropped again.

In April 2019, the board of the European Banking Authority (EBA) acquitted both the Danish and Estonian financial supervision authorities in connection with the whitewashing case in Danske Bank.¹ The EU Commission requested that EBA conducted an investigation of the case, and following the investigation, EBA concluded that neither the Danish nor Estonian authorities had violated the EU legislation in relation to the case.

During the revelation of the whitewashing scandal in Danske Bank, the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority was criticised for relying too much on the information provided by Danske Bank, for not having investigated the matter and warnings thoroughly enough, and for not having used its possibilities to intervene in the matter².

What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

An actor from the authority explained that the case began in the media with a newspaper starting to reveal the case. Due to the scope of the incident, the interviewee indicated the perception that the media were obliged to pursue the case and perceived that the media acted objectively in their coverage. The interviewee perceived that the media often pursued a negative angle in relation to the authority, but does so objectively. Another interviewee also stressed the negative angles and perceived this to be opposed to being objective. This interviewee believed that the news media had a clear negative impact on trust in the financial authority during the case. Another interviewee described the same perception. The interviewees did not perceive social media to play a role in relation to the incident.

Actors from the financial supervision authority described how the authority carefully considered their communication, acknowledged criticism from the media at the time and sought to explain, within a limited framework (due to a need for confidentiality to protect the customers of the banks and to protect the business of the Danish banks), how things were connected, e.g., changes in legislation. This was, however, perceived difficult and complex to convey.

5.6.1.1 Content analysis of media coverage of the Whitewashing case

Table 27 and Figure 106 show the number of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, or negative coverage of the incident, as well as their relative share. There were 61 articles with negative coverage (90 percent), 5 articles with positive coverage (7 percent) and 2 articles with neutral coverage (3 percent).

Table 27. Number of incident specific articles with positive, negative, or neutral coverage for The Whitewashing Case in Denmark

	Incident
Negative	61
Positive	5
Neutral	2

¹ <https://finans.dk/finans2/ECE11328623/dansk-og-estisk-finanstilsyn-frikendt-i-danske-banksagen/>

² <https://www.information.dk/indland/leder/2019/01/hvem-kan-stole-paa-finanstilsynet-frifinder-skandalen>






Figure 106. Share of incident specific articles with positive, negative, or neutral coverage for The Whitewashing Case in Denmark

Table 28 shows the number of articles with positive or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions before, during, and after the incident. There were a few both positive and negative articles before the incident, 72 articles with negative coverage and four with positive coverage during the incident, and 15 articles with negative coverage and three articles with positive coverage after the incident. All three dimensions have received either positive or negative both before, during and after the incident, but most coverage have concerned the ability-dimension.

Table 28. Number of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for The Whitewashing Case in Denmark

	Before		Incident		After	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
A	2	3	3	53	3	14
B	1	1	0	2	0	1
I	0	3	1	17	0	3

Figure 107 shows the share of articles with positive or negative media coverage of the three trust-dimensions before, during and after the incident. The relative share of positive coverage was highest before the incident compared to during and after the incident.




Figure 107. Share of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for The Whitewashing Case in Denmark

Figure 108 shows that the negative opinions were voiced by several different actors but especially by the media (23 times) and political/legislative actors (20 times).




Figure 108. Negative opinions voiced by different types of actors for The Whitewashing Case in Denmark

Figures 109 and 110 show the share of articles with a response from the agency as well as the type of response. The agency responded in 36 percent of the articles and used several types of responses. The most prominent responses were silence despite being asked, denial of responsibility and blame shifting.






Figure 109. Share of articles with a response from the agency for The Whitewashing Case in Denmark




Figure 110. Types of responses by the agency for The Whitewashing Case in Denmark

5.6.1.2 Analysis of Regulatory Authorities and heads of regulatory agencies on Twitter during incident 1

Neither the regulatory authorities nor the heads of the regulatory authorities were active on Twitter during the incident period.

5.6.2 Incident 2: The MRSA case (9/2016 - 11/2016)

The incident involved the role that the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration played in omitting key recommendations on the infectious MRSA bacterium among pigs.



Between 2008 and 2011, a number of Danish farmers voluntarily participated in an examination conducted by the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration on the occurrence of MRSA in their pig herds. MRSA was found in 48 herds.

In the beginning of 2012, more and more stories appeared in the media about Danes being infected with an antibiotic-resistant staphylococcal MRSA bacterium, the so-called “pig bacterium” which was spread to human from the pig pens where it had been developing resistance to the large amounts of antibiotics used in pig production.

In the spring of 2012, the then Minister of Food asked the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration to make a status report to the Danish Parliament's Food Committee on the size of the problem of the resistant pig bacteria, and what could be done to limit further spread of the bacterium. The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration asked, e.g., the Technical University of Denmark (DTU) for recommendations on what could be done to limit the spread of MRSA. Researchers at the DTU recommended a focus on limiting the infection of the multi-resistant bacteria MRSA among the so-called “top breeding pigs”. This recommendation was sent to the Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries as part of the report on MRSA spread, and according to the Minister at the time, the recommendation from the DTU did in fact reach her.

The DTU put forth their recommendation on multiple occasions during the following years.

The original draft of the report with the recommendation was written in May 2012. In the period 7-12 June 2012, the draft was adjusted and e-mailed back and forth between the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration and the department of the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries. In the final version of the MRSA report, which was sent to members of the Danish Parliament, the recommendation by the DTU researchers regarding the “top breeding pigs” had been removed. An internal e-mail showed that the veterinary director of the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration had removed important aspects from the DTU recommendations regarding the limitation of the MRSA spread.

In 2015, the Danish Parliament agreed on a MRSA plan to reduce the use of antibiotics in farming.

On 12 September 2016, the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) aired a documentary entitled “The day the penicillin does not work” which documented the role of the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration in omitting the recommendations by the DTU. The documentary claimed that the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration over a period of six years systematically removed recommendations by the DTU regarding how the increasing problem with MRSA could be controlled. This included the central recommendation by one of the world’s leading experts in resistant bacteria regarding the top breeding pigs. According to the experts, the MRSA spread among pigs should be controlled by ensuring that the breeding pigs were MRSA-free, because the researchers believed that the breeding pigs could be a hotbed for MRSA infection. A top-down approach focusing on the breeding pigs was assessed to be able to prevent the spread to a very large extent. The DTU, thus, recommended testing the breeding pigs for MRSA infection (and to take actions among those infected), which could potentially be very costly for the Danish pig exports. The central interest organisation, The Danish Agriculture and Food Council, lobbied strongly against the testing of the breeding pigs.

The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration denied responsibility for removing the sections from the report and argued that the agency and the ministry agreed to the adjustments following a usual dialogue. The agency thus claimed that the Ministry was informed about the DTU recommendations regarding the top breeding pigs.

The incident led to heavy criticism of the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration.

According to a later report initiated by the new Minister for Environment and Food, following the documentary, the recommendations by the DTU researchers did actually reach the then Ministry, and the report argues that it was a political decision not to follow the recommendations.



What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

For this incident one stakeholder from a large interest organisation was interviewed. The stakeholder's perception was that the media lacked nuances in their coverage of the incident, and that they focused on worst case scenarios and primarily interviewed experts who were very critical and concerned of the use of antibiotics on pigs. The media were perceived as only advancing two point of views; a) why the industry and the agency did not do more to prevent the spread of MRSA and; b) why the industry did not just stop using antibiotics on pigs. The stakeholder used the media in an attempt to advance nuances to the incident and to explain the professional reasons and arguments as objectively as possible. The stakeholder perceived that news coverage primarily came from traditional news media relative to social media.

5.6.2.1 Content analysis of media coverage of the MRSA case in Denmark

Table 29 and Figure 111 show the number of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, or negative coverage of the incident, as well as their relative share. There were 6 articles with negative coverage (86 percent), no neutral articles and 1 article with positive coverage (14 percent).

Table 29. Number of incident specific articles with positive, negative, or neutral coverage for the MRSA Case in Denmark

	Incident
Negative	6
Positive	1
Neutral	0




Figure 111. Share of incident specific articles with positive, negative, or neutral coverage for MRSA Case in Denmark

Table 30 shows the number of articles with positive or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions before, during, and after the incident. There were a few, mainly negative articles before the incident, six negative and one positive coverage of the trust-dimensions during the incident, and 11 negative and three positive articles after the incident.



Table 30. Number of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the MRSA case in Denmark

	Before		Incident		After	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
A	1	4	1	2	1	8
B	0	1	0	0	0	0
I	0	0	0	4	0	3

Figure 112 shows the share of articles with positive or negative media coverage of the three trust-dimensions before, during and after the incident. The relative share of positive coverage was highest during the incident compared to before and after. However, both before, during and after the incident, the coverage was mainly negative.




Figure 112. Share of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before, during and after the incident of trust violation for the MRSA case in Denmark

Figure 113 shows that the negative opinions were voiced by three different actors; the media (6 occasions), political/legislative actors (three occasions) and experts (one occasion).






Figure 113. Negative opinions voiced by different types of actors for the MRSA case in Denmark

Figures 114 and 115 show the share of articles with a response from the agency as well as the type of response. The agency responded in 33 percent of the articles and used three types of responses: justifications (three occasions), admission of problem (one occasion) and denial of problem (one occasion).




Figure 114. Share of articles with a response from the agency for the MRSA case in Denmark




Figure 115. Types of responses by the agency for the MRSA case in Denmark

5.6.2.2 Analysis of Regulatory Authorities and heads of regulatory agencies on Twitter during incident 2

Figure 116 shows the number of tweets by the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the food safety sector with the incident period marked with grey. It appears that the regulatory authorities began their activity on Twitter at the time of the incident, whereas there does not seem to be an overlap in tweets from the heads of the regulatory agencies and the incident period.




Figure 116. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the food sector in the period 2015-2020, incident period marked with grey [Denmark]



5.7 The Netherlands

5.7.1 Incident 1: The Fipronil case (7/2017 - 4/2021. Data covers the period from 7/2017 to 12/2020)

The incident pertains to the use of the illegal substance Fipronil in Dutch chicken farms and the contamination of eggs due to this use.

As a consequence of the use of certain products; pesticides against mites as well as cleaning products, from the supplier ChickFriend, eggs and meat had potentially been contaminated with fipronil. In large quantities, the drug can be harmful to kidneys, liver or thyroid gland in humans.

According to Belgian authorities, The Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) knew about fipronil in the poultry sector in November 2016. The NVWA responded that they had received a tip in November 2016 that fipronil was being used, but they only knew that it was used to clean stables. The NVWA, therefore, had no reason to believe that it would end up in eggs, and that it might pose a potential threat to human health. This is how they justified their lack of immediate action.

In June, NVWA was made aware of the prohibited cleaning methods of ChickFriend. However, not until August 2017 did the NVWA warn against consuming the eggs contaminated with fipronil. While it took a while for the Dutch public to realise this lag, Belgian authorities criticised NVWA for responding too slowly. NVWA said that they did not react sooner, because at that time there was no indications of risk to human health.

At this point, the NVWA pointed to potential contamination at one farm, but the problem turned out to be bigger than that. Several chicken farms were contaminated with fipronil. At one company, the fipronil content found in the eggs was so high that the NVWA recommended throwing these eggs away, and the deputy inspector, general Freek van Zoeren from NVWA, advised – while on a popular news programme – the public, if possible, to refrain from eating eggs for a few days until test results were final. . A spokesperson from NVWA however did not want to repeat this advice.

According to the farmers' association, the farmers must not have been aware of the presence of fipronil in the pesticide they were using and they found the messages from NVWA created unrest among consumers just as ChickFriend found the panic exaggerated. To run any risk, someone weighing 80 kilos would have to eat 960 eggs (at once).

The warning and contamination had important economic implications for the affected producers. The poultry farmers criticised the NVWA that they had been left to their own devices after suffering immense losses. The fipronil affair is assumed to have cost the poultry sector more than 100 million euros, expects the Dutch Poultry Farmers' Union.

The NVWA was taken to court by the farmers' organisation LTO Nederland and a number of poultry farmers, because the regulator was accused to have been "negligent and careless" during the fipronil crisis. According to the lawyer of LTO and the poultry farmers, enormous damage would have been prevented if the authority had warned the sector when it received the tip in November 2016. Nonetheless, the farmers lost their case.

However, the producers received criticism from both parliamentarians and NVWA, which published a report criticising the sector for not sufficiently reporting fraud and suspicious activities to the regulator.

In June 2018, The Sorgdrager Committee published a final report on the fipronil scandal. The report criticised the NVWA for acting too slowly, the business community for not reporting, and the government for underestimating the crisis. As a result, food safety in the Netherlands was put at risk. The NVWA had not sufficiently fulfilled its task as a supervisor of food safety, the report concluded. In fact, the agency was found to be insufficiently prepared for a food safety crises. During the fipronil crisis, the NVWA ignored its own protocols and rules when reports first came in. They were not registered in the right way or place, thus, the research was not started in time.



The main suspects in the fipronil affair were sentenced to two years in prison for endangering public health.

What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

The fact that deputy inspector, general Freek van Zoeren, actively used the mass media to warn the consumers generated substantial criticism, and the agency wanted to correct that. However, other stakeholders also used the media actively to set their own agenda. Whereas parts of the media were experienced to represent the case fairly, others were seen by stakeholders as less objective and with a more limited knowledge of the case.

5.7.1.1 Content analysis of media coverage of the Fipronil case

Table 31 and Figure 117 show the number of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, or negative coverage of the incident, as well as the share of neutral, positive, and negative coverage. There were 37 articles with negative coverage (82 percent), four articles with positive coverage (10 percent).

Table 31. Number of incident specific articles with positive, negative, or neutral coverage for the Fipronil case in the Netherlands

	Incident
Negative	31
Positive	4
Neutral	3




Figure 117. Share of incident specific articles with positive, negative or neutral coverage for the Fipronil case in the Netherlands

Table 32 shows the number of articles with positive or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions before and during the incident. There were a few both negative and positive articles before the incident and several articles with negative coverage during the incident. Most of the negative articles concerned the ability-dimension.



Table 32. Number of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before and during the incident of trust violation for the Fipronil case in the Netherlands

	Before		Incident	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
A	0	3	3	25
B	0	1	0	14
I	0	1	0	11

Note: No after period

Figure 118 shows the share of articles with positive and negative media coverage of the three trust-dimensions before and during the incident. In both instances, the coverage was almost exclusively negative.




Figure 118. Share of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before and during the incident of trust violation for [INCIDENT 1] in the Netherlands

Figure 119 shows that the negative opinions were voiced by several different actors but especially by interest organisations (11 occasions), citizens (6 occasions) and political/legislative actors (5 occasions).






Figure 119. Negative opinions voiced by different types of actors for the Fipronil case in The Netherlands

Figures 120 and 121 show the share of articles with a response from the agency as well as the type of response. The agency responded in 14 percent of the articles and used several types of responses.




Figure 120. Share of articles with a response from the agency for the Fipronil case in The Netherlands




Figure 121. Types of responses by the agency for the Fipronil case in The Netherlands

5.7.1.2 Analysis of Regulatory Authorities and heads of regulatory agencies on Twitter during incident 1

Figure 122 shows the number of tweets by the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the food safety sector with the incident period marked with grey. For the regulatory agencies, there is a peak right after the start of the incident period. After that peak and incident start, the general level of tweets is higher than it was before the incident. The same trend is seen for the heads of the regulatory agencies. However, it should be noted that there is an overlap between incident 1 and incident 2.




Figure 122. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the food sector in the period 2015-2020, incident period marked with grey [Netherlands]



5.7.2 Incident 2: The Horsemeat case (1/2013-12/2017. Data covers 1/2015-12/2017)

The horsemeat case covers a number of incidents where horsemeat was found in products marketed as beef by Dutch companies.

In February 2013, horsemeat was found in products labelled as beef in several European countries. French authorities pointed the finger at a Dutch meat trader “Draap”, who had recently purchased sixty tons of horse meat from a Romanian slaughterhouse. The Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit/ Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) closed the meat processing plant Willy Selten, under suspicion that they had been mixing horse meat with beef and sold it as pure beef. The following month, it was declared that the horse meat could not be considered safe, due to flaws in the reporting of the origin of the horse meat. The NVWA recalled 50.000 tons of meat from the market produced by Willy Selten. This was later confirmed by a judge, and the company filed for bankruptcy and the director was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison. In May 2013, a Dutch broadcaster “Een vandaag” investigated the origin of the horsemeat, and concluded that it did not come from the Romanian slaughterhouse, but from British and Irish gangs.

Following this incident, other incidents which concerned the addition of horsemeat to beef appeared. In March 2014, the Dutch Safety Board (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid) published a report that declared that the safety of Dutch meat was not guaranteed. They pointed out to a series of meat fraud incidents, poor hygiene, and problematic risk assessment of the dangers for human health. The NVWA was also criticised in the report, that it had insufficient information knowledge on how to combat fraud, that its inspectors had a double role both inspecting the meat in companies and supervising the production. The companies themselves also had to pay for NVWA supervision, which put them in the role of consumers who set the standards of their own work. Lastly, the NVWA had been criticised that it had gone through reorganisations and budget cuts in the last few years, which had effectively weakened the supervision, as now it occurred routinely, which led to important risks to be missed.

The NVWA is to safeguard human and animal health and welfare and monitor safety of food and consumer products as well as to enforce nature regulation in the Netherlands. Its parent ministry is the Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit (Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality) and it is a delivery agency for Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport). The agency is both a traditional agency in reference to the minister and a national inspection, which provides the agency with extended autonomy, e.g., on budgetary questions and with regard to regulatory decisions.

These incidents resulted in serious criticisms towards the NVWA. Beyond the regulatory failure of not being able to guarantee the safety of Dutch meat, the agency was criticised as being too close to producers, since they had been paying for the controls. Controllers work in both a controlling and supervising capacity and the agency itself has gone through reorganisations and budget cuts in the last few years, which has effectively weakened the supervision, as now it occurs routinely, which leads to important risks to be missed.

An improvement plan was set up for NVWA in 2013 to run until 2017. However, in 2015, the NVWA was under fire from politicians, companies and the public. It was argued that the reorganisation had failed. Whereas the responsible ministry argued that NVWA had to act more firmly, the companies associations argued that the NVWA was ruining them due to too many rules being harshly implemented, and consumer associations argued that the NVWA was too passive. The NVWA was criticised for being too unapproachable towards the public and passive in the press.

What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

The media were not always perceived as well informed regarding the incident by the regulator and relevant stakeholders. They all experienced important differences of the approach between media outlets where some were perceived as objective and fair, while others focused more on amusing people. Some stakeholders experienced the media interest as very intense and as primarily focusing on finding more fraudulent cases. Some stakeholders, though, experienced that the media used the stakeholders' expertise to gain insights and communicate some of the more scientific aspects of the incident. Additionally, some stakeholders had the



impression that traditional media focused mainly on the Netherlands, while social media had a more international view on the incident.

Both agency and stakeholders used the media in their strategic communication. The agency chose to communicate proactively about the incident in the news media and found this to help increase understanding of their position regarding the incident. Similarly, some stakeholders used the media to reach their target audiences both to increase awareness of the incident, to make political statements on it, to communicate scientific perspectives and to reach target audiences with specific information.

While the incident could potentially affect trust among stakeholders, this is not seen as based on the media coverage but rather as being due to the substantial content of the incident.

5.7.2.1 Content analysis of media coverage of the Horsemeat case

Table 33 and Figure 123 show the number of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, or negative coverage of the incident, as well as the share of neutral, positive, and negative coverage. There were 5 articles with negative coverage (83 percent), no articles with positive coverage, and 1 article with neutral coverage (17 percent).

Table 33. Number of incident specific articles with positive, negative, or neutral coverage for the Horsemeat case in the Netherlands

	Incident
Negative	5
Positive	0
Neutral	1




Figure 123. Share of incident specific articles with positive, negative, or neutral coverage for the Horsemeat case in the Netherlands

Table 34 shows the number of articles with positive or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions before and during the incident. There were some articles with negative coverage of the three trust dimensions before the incident, and an increasing amount of negative coverage during the incident. There were two instances of positive coverage of the ability dimension during the incident.



Table 34. Number of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions during and after the incident of trust violation for the Horsemeat case in the Netherlands

	Incident		After	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
A	0	4	2	10
B	0	3	0	2
I	0	2	0	3

Note: No before period

Figure 124 shows the share of articles with positive and negative media coverage of the three trust-dimensions before and during the incident. The coverage was primarily negative. The only positive coverage was of the ability dimension during the incident.




Figure 124. Share of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions during and after the incident of trust violation for the Horsemeat case in the Netherlands

Figure 125 shows that the negative opinions were raised by interest organisations (one occasion).






Figure 125. Negative opinions voiced by different types of actors for the Horsemeat case in the Netherlands

Figures 126 and 127 show the share of articles with a response from the agency as well as the type of response. The agency responded to the criticism in 20 percent of the articles by denying a problem (1 occasion).




Figure 126. Share of articles with a response from the agency for [INCIDENT 2] in the Netherlands




Figure 127. Types of responses by the agency for the Horsemeat case in The Netherlands

5.7.2.2 Analysis of Regulatory Authorities and heads of regulatory agencies on Twitter during incident 2

Figure 128 shows the number of tweets by the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the food safety sector with the incident period marked with grey. The level of tweets for the regulatory agencies are relatively stable throughout most of the incident period, however, increasing towards the end and peaking in July 2017. The heads of the regulatory agencies are inactive for most of the incident period but become more active towards the end. As previously mentioned, there is an overlap between incident 1 and incident 2.




Figure 128. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the food sector in the period 2015-2020, incident period marked with grey [Netherlands]



5.8 Poland

5.8.1 Incident 1: Co-operative Savings Case (data covers 3/2015 - 10/2019)

The Polish Financial Supervision Authority (the PFSA) commenced its activities on 19 September 2006, i.e., the date when the Act on Financial Market Supervision of 21 July 2006 (Dz. U. of 2006, No. 157, item 1119, as amended) came into force. The purpose of supervision of the financial market is to ensure its proper functioning, stability, security and transparency, confidence in the financial market, and to ensure that the interests of market participants are protected.

The Act on the supervision of SKOKs (Co-operative Savings and Credit Unions) was passed in 2009, but it did not come into force until late 2012. The only control of SKOKs was internal and was exercised by the SKOK National Fund (Kasa Krajowa). During 2009-2012, both deposits and loans tripled. Poles deposited more than 15 billion Zlotys in SKOKs, but no one except a narrow group of managers knew how this money was managed and in what financial condition the individual funds were.

On 17 October 2012, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority requested Kasa Krajowa to provide information and materials concerning high-risk banks, including SKOK Wołomin. The information was presented on 25 September 2012. The PFSA found this information presented to be insufficient and requested its supplementation. In response to the PFSA's letter of 17 October 2012, Kasa Krajowa, referring to the situation of SKOK Wołomin, stated that, in its opinion, SKOK Wołomin had a high-risk portfolio of loans and high-amount credits, due to connections between persons who took on those liabilities, as well as due to observed cash operations. Kasa Krajowa reported that it did not file a notice to the prosecutor's office in this case due to the lack of property damage associated with the identified risks.

On 27 December 2012, SKOK Wołomin submitted a report on the audit conducted by the auditor pursuant to Article 87 of the SKOK Act. In accordance with the report, as of 30 September 2012, the Bank reported a profit (of PLN 30,123.4 thousand). Less than a month after receiving the first reporting data, the PFSA carried out an audit in SKOK Wołomin as the first SKOK in the whole system. The findings of the inspection formed the basis for a report to the prosecutor's office on the possibility of committing a crime which took place in May 2013. The PFSA, following its findings after the audit, made 35 main recommendations, including the areas of:

- (a) asset quality - 13 recommendations
- (b) payment liquidity - 2 recommendations
- (c) financial situation and management of the Fund - 20 recommendations,

referring in detail to the identified threats and violations of legal regulations.

According to the media, the liquidity support system, which was supposed to be provided by Kasa Krajowa for the whole system of SKOKs in case of threats, worked in such a way that the money from it evaporated abroad to Luxembourg instead of supporting Wołomin.

In May 2013, the PFSA published the results of an audit of the financial condition of the cash registers up to the end of 2012. It was the first document showing the scale of negligence. For example, it turned out that as much as 37 percent of the loans granted by the credit unions were past due (the so-called overdue loans).

By a letter dated 26 November 2013, the PFSA notified SKOK Wołomin of its intention to initiate an inspection with respect to SKOK Wołomin's compliance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act for the period from 1 January 2013 to 20 December 2013.

In April 2014, Wojciech Kwasniak – Vice-Chair of the PFSA, was severely beaten, most likely at the behest of a member of the SKOK Wołomin, as the media speculated. Later that month, a member of the management board of SKOK Wołomin was arrested and on 29 October 2014. President of SKOK Wołomin and Vice-president of SKOK Wołomin were also arrested.



On 4 November 2014, as a result of the analysis of the evidence gathered in the case, the PFSA concluded that SKOK Wołomin in its activities grossly violated the provisions of the law which resulted in the threat of cessation of payment of liabilities by the SKOK. The information on the liquidity situation of SKOK Wołomin indicated that press reports on the arrest and irregularities that took place at SKOK Wołomin had such an impact on the members of SKOK Wołomin that less than a month after the appointment of the compulsory receiver, there was a real risk of loss of liquidity at the SKOK Wołomin in connection with a mass withdrawal of deposits. December 10 2014, the PFSA made a decision to suspend the operations of SKOK Wołomin pursuant to Article 74k(2) in conjunction with Article 74k section 1 of the SKOK Act.

A year later, it was declared bankrupt. The Bank Guarantee Fund (BFG) paid out over PLN 2.2 billion to the cooperatives of the failed SKOK Wołomin. The BFG guarantees up to EUR 100 thousand to bank clients and cooperatives of SKOKs. Several hundred clients had deposits in excess of that amount, so they could not count on a return of the excess over EUR 100,000.

The investigation of illegalities in the Wołomin SKOK has come full circle. In 2018, the National Prosecutor's Office reported that in all proceedings concerning the SKOK, charges were heard against almost 900 people, indictments have already been filed against more than 300, and more than 150 people have been legally sentenced. All the ongoing proceedings concerning the Wołomin SKOK may concern extortion of up to PLN 3 billion. Media reported that the investigation files showed that between 2009 and 2014, SKOK Wołomin did not give out loans to basically anyone who applied for them, but simply gave out loans, often for hundreds of thousands or even a few million Zlotys. Approx. 400 creditors never repaid their obligations. Moreover, they informed that criminals connected with the SKOK Wołomin scam had defrauded about two billion Zlotys. Some of these funds were to be invested in various industries, including the media, tourism, and even a crematorium.

In 2018, The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), officers detained Wojciech Kwaśniak, Vice-Chair of the PFSA. Together with his former boss Andrzej Jakubiak and six other officials, he was taken to the prosecutor's office in Szczecin (which was difficult to explain, as the Szczecin prosecutor's office had not previously conducted any activities) only to be released shortly afterwards. The detention was described, by coalition politicians and part of the media, as a political act.

In February 2019, the court in Szczecin revoked all preventive measures taken against the former head of the PFSA Andrzej Jakubiak and his deputy Wojciech Kwaśniak.

The SKOK Wołomin case has not been fully settled yet.

Summing up, despite the fact that it was the PFSA that discovered the SKOK Wołomin scandal, the trust in this institution was undermined. The PFSA was criticized for its delayed reaction, late implementation of supervision of SKOKs. The situation was leveraged by politicians and broadly discussed in media. It was speculated that the agency most certainly had known about the incident. The PFSA was called "banksters", claimed to be incompetent and failed to warn people.

What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

The media were perceived as affecting the case, because media stories on the case led to more people taking their money out. While some stakeholders noted limited attention paid to the case, others found that the media mainly covered the case on a superficial level with most attention to the scandalous elements of the case. Some found that, due to the complexity of the case, it was difficult for the media to cover it correctly. Some found the incident to be used in political battles.

Sources used in the case description:

1. https://www.knf.gov.pl/en/ABOUT_US/Legal_framework
2. https://www.knf.gov.pl/en/ABOUT_US/Tasks_and_objectives
3. <https://biznes.wprost.pl/firmy-i-rynki/10446559/skok-wolomin-o-co-chodzi-w-aferze.html>



4. Schedule of the PFSA's actions regarding SKOK Wołomin, https://www.knf.gov.pl/knf/pl/komponenty/img/harmonogram_dzialan_KNF_w_sprawie_SKOK_Wolomin_58747.pdf
5. <https://www.rp.pl/opinie-ekonomiczne/art295491-maciej-stanczuk-jak-to-z-afery-skok-wolomin-bylo>
6. <https://biznes.wprost.pl/firmy-i-rynki/10446559/skok-wolomin-o-co-chodzi-w-aferyze.html>
7. <https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/afery-skok-wolomin-pb-kasa-spoldzielcza-prala-pieniadze-w-krematorium-6690469148146336a.html>
8. <https://wyborcza.biz/biznes/7,177151,28076829,jest-pierwszy-zwiastun-korzeni-zla-afery-skok-wolomin-pokazana.html>

5.8.1.1 Content analysis of media coverage of the Co-operative Savings case

Table 35 and Figure 129 show the number of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, or negative coverage of the incident, as well as the share of neutral, positive, and negative coverage. There were 14 articles with negative coverage (78 percent), 3 articles with positive coverage (17 percent) and one neutral article (5 percent).

Table 35. Number of incident specific articles with positive, negative, or neutral coverage for the Co-operative Savings case in Poland

	Incident
Negative	14
Positive	3
Neutral	1




Figure 129. Share of incident specific articles with positive, negative, or neutral coverage for the Co-operative Savings case in Poland

Table 36 shows the number of articles with positive or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions during and after the incident. There were more articles with negative coverage after the incident compared to during the incident. The amount of positive coverage is about the same during and after.



Table 36. Number of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions during and after the incident of trust violation for The Co-operative Savings Case in Poland

	Incident		After	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
A	3	13	4	10
B	0	3	0	10
I	0	5	0	15

Figure 130 shows the share of articles with positive and negative media coverage of the three trust-dimensions before and during the incident. The coverage was primarily negative. The relative share of positive coverage was similar during, and after the incident.




Figure 130. Share of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions during and after the incident of trust violation for The Co-operative Savings case in Poland

Figure 131 shows that the negative opinions were raised by different types of actors, but predominately by the media (10 occasions).






Figure 131. Negative opinions voiced by different types of actors for The Co-operative Savings case in Poland

Figures 132 and 133 show the share of articles with a response from the agency as well as the type of response. The agency responded in 12 percent of the articles and used two types of responses: problem denial and silence.




Figure 132. Share of articles with a response from the agency for The Co-operative Savings case in Poland




Figure 133. Types of responses by the agency for The Co-operative Savings case in Poland

5.8.1.2 Analysis of Regulatory Authorities and heads of regulatory agencies on Twitter during incident 1

Figure 134 shows the number of tweets by the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the financial sector with the incident period marked with grey. For the regulatory agencies, there is a slight increase in the volume of monthly tweets throughout the period. The heads of regulatory agencies are more or less inactive throughout the whole period. It should be noted that there is an overlap between incident 1 and incident 2.




Figure 134. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the financial sector in the period 2015-2020, incident period marked with grey [Poland]



5.8.2 Incident 2: Supervision Authority Leadership case (data covers 2/2018-12/2020)

The case concerns the Polish Financial Supervision Authority, see previous case for a description.

The PFSA incident is a result of the publication of "Gazeta Wyborcza" in November 2018. The newspaper published an article describing that the then chair of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority wanted PLN 40 million from Getin Noble Bank owner Leszek Czarnecki for protecting the bank.

In February 2017, Getin Noble Bank stopped meeting capital requirements and came under the supervision of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority. This happened after the introduction of the Ministry of Finance regulation in 2017, which tightened capital requirements for banks' lending in foreign currencies. According to this regulation, from then on, they had to have 15 percent of the amount that they lent to their clients in cash. A year after the bank was put under the supervision of the PFSA, Leszek Czarnecki received an invitation from its chair, Marek Chrzanowski, for a conversation at the PFSA headquarter.

According to Czarnecki, Chrzanowski made the support conditional on a specific amount - 1 percent of the bank's value, or PLN 40 million, according to the Getin owner. He presented Czarnecki with a proposal for the future of his bank, that would be taken over by the state for 'one zloty'. According to the bank owner, the chairman wrote down the amount on a piece of paper and showed it to him. Czarnecki recorded the conversation and notified the prosecutor's office of the suspected crime.

Five months later, in September 2018, a draft law aimed at strengthening the supervision, and an investor protection of the financial sector entered the Parliament's session. Already in the first reading, an amendment was submitted allowing the administrative takeover of a bank whose total own funds would be too low or even in a situation as soon as there is a risk of such a condition. The amendment left the decision on the takeover of the bank to the discretion of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority.

On 7 November, the attorney of Leszek Czarnecki, Roman Giertych, submitted to the public prosecutor's office a notice of a possible crime committed by the former head of the Financial Supervision Authority, Marek Chrzanowski. A day later, the parliamentary Committee for Public Finance received an amendment to the banking law, which gave the Financial Supervision Authority the power to order the takeover of one bank by another. On 9 November, two days after Giertych's notification, the Parliament passed the act.

Marek Chrzanowski resigned in response to accusations made by investor Leszek Czarnecki, but before he left he put Czarnecki's other bank, Idea Bank, on the list of public warnings, even though no indicators showed that it had solvency problems. The reason for this move was the alleged brokerage activity without a permit, namely the sale of GetBack bonds.

On 14 November, CBA agents entered the Polish Financial Supervision Authority securing minutes and recordings of the Board's meetings on the Getin Noble Bank's recovery proceedings and the situation in Idea Bank. They were also looking for documents concerning the acquisition of shares in GetBack SA and the sale of GetBack bonds.

Chrzanowski insisted that the one percent offer was not there, which is why the investigators decided to subject him to a lie detector test. The same examination was conducted on Leszek Czarnecki. As revealed by the "Wyborcza Daily", which found the indictment against Chrzanowski, the test came out unfavourable for the former chair of the PFSA. The expert stated that Marek Chrzanowski, while answering the question: "Did you suggest to Mr. Czarnecki in writing a percentage of Kowalczyk's salary? At the meeting with Mr. Czarnecki, did you write a percentage referring to Kowalczyk's salary?", reacted in a manner usually observed in persons answering insincerely (contrary to their knowledge). Moreover, the results of Marek Chrzanowski's tests (during the four tests) together with the expert's observation justified the suspicion of incompetent attempts to intentionally distort the recorded data.

The indictment against Chrzanowski was sent to the Warsaw court on 31 December 2019. As reported by the daily news media, the billionaire was accused under Article 231 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code, which deals with the abuse of power by a public official in order to achieve financial gain.



On 27 November 2018, Marek Chrzanowski was arrested for two months. At the end of January 2019, Chrzanowski was released. The prosecutor's office imposed on him a PLN 250,000 property surety, placed him under police supervision and banned him from contacting witnesses in the case.

According to the investigators, under the PFSA resolution, the chair of the PFSA was obliged to "refrain from any personal matters that could interfere or indicate a conflict with the performance of his duties as a member of the PFSA, and to refrain from any action that could expose the PFSA to a loss of confidence".

So far, over 40 witnesses have been questioned in the investigation, including the President of the National Bank of Poland. In June 2019, the prosecution removed Leszek Czarnecki and his attorney Roman Giertych from influencing the proceedings and from access to information regarding the investigation. As a reason, the prosecution stated that the proposal made by Marek Chrzanowski did not cause any harm to him, as well as there was no violation of any legal good of Leszek Czarnecki. Therefore, the businessman did not have the status of an aggrieved party. As a result, access to the results of the variographic examination of both Czarnecki and Chrzanowski has been blocked.

Chrzanowski was charged with trespassing and acting against the public interest of the state for personal gain, and the indictment went to court on 31 December 2019.

The court still has not dealt with the PFSA corruption scandal. Marek Chrzanowski is still waiting for the first hearing (7 March 2022).

Summing up, the incident did not involve an accusation against the entire institution but against a specific person. However, this person (Chair of PFSA who is accused to have made the corrupt proposal) was the face of the PFSA, so it had a tremendous impact on trust in the entire institution. At the same time, as stated by one of the interviewees, during the incident information emerged showing how the PFSA operated, how it understood its mission.

What role did the media play as perceived by the actors involved in the incident?

The regulator experienced extensive media interest in the case, and it was experienced as if there was an attempt to draw the agency into a political battle, i.e., Chrzanowski offered Czarnecki "protection" from the group that wanted to force the Getin into bankruptcy, so that the government could then buy it for "a symbolic 1 Zloty" and hand it over to a particular bank for supervision.

Similarly, the interviewed stakeholders mainly present the media as the tools of political forces which tried to frame the case. Some were seen as trying to slander Getin Bank to defend Chrzanowski from the corruption charges. Hence, the media were not seen as playing any major role in its own right.

Sources used in the case:

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2. <https://www.money.pl/banki/afera-knf-marek-chrzanowski-klamal-na-temat-propozycji-dla-leszka-czarneckiego-6468203864582273a.html>
3. http://www.rozumuj.pl/icopost.php?zajawinf=artyks/icd/polityka/20200405_afera_knf.inf
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8. <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/afera-knf-marek-chrzanowski-nadal-pracuje-na-prestizowej-uczelni-6455247165851265a>



5.8.2.1 Content analysis of media coverage of the Supervision Authority Leadership case

Table 37 and Figure 134 show the number of incident specific articles with neutral, positive, or negative coverage of the incident, as well as the share of neutral, positive, and negative coverage. There were 149 articles with negative coverage (95 percent), 7 articles with positive coverage (4 percent) and one neutral article (<1 percent).

Table 37. Number of incident specific articles with positive, negative, or neutral coverage for the Supervision Authority Leadership case in Poland

	Incident
Negative	149
Positive	7
Neutral	1




Figure 134. Share of incident specific articles with positive, negative or neutral coverage for the Supervision Authority Leadership case in Poland

Table 38 shows the number of articles with positive or negative coverage of the three trust-dimensions before and during the incident. There was some positive (13 articles) and negative coverage (31 articles) before the incident, and a substantial amount of negative coverage of especially the benevolence (94 articles) and integrity (132 articles) dimensions during the incident.

Table 38. Number of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before and during the incident of trust violation for the Supervision Authority Leadership case in Poland

	Before		Incident	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
A	12	27	8	20
B	1	4	1	94
I	0	0	1	132

Figure 135 shows the share of articles with positive and negative media coverage of the three trust-dimensions before and during the incident. The coverage was primarily negative. Before the incident the



media coverage concerned two of the three trust dimensions, and during the incident all three trust dimensions were covered in the articles.




Figure 135. Share of articles with positive or negative coverage of A, B and I dimensions before and during the incident of trust violation for the Supervision Authority Leadership case in Poland

Figure 136 shows that the negative opinions were raised by different types of actors, but very predominately by the media (>130 occasions).




Figure 136. Negative opinions voiced by different types of actors for the Supervision Authority Leadership case in Poland

Figure 137 and 138 show the share of articles with a response from the agency as well as the type of response. The agency responded in 5 percent of the articles and used three types of responses; predominately problem denial but also silence and amending actions.




Figure 137. Share of articles with a response from the agency for the Supervision Authority Leadership case in Poland




Figure 138. Types of responses by the agency for the Supervision Authority Leadership case in Poland

5.8.2.2 Analysis of Regulatory Authorities and heads of regulatory agencies on Twitter during incident 2

Figure 139 shows the number of tweets by the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the financial sector with the incident period marked with grey. In the beginning of the incident period, the volume of tweets by the regulatory authorities is stable with a peak towards the end of the period. The



number of tweets by the heads of the regulatory authorities is for a large portion of the incident period more or less inactive, however, it peaks in the same month as the regulatory authorities. Towards the very end of the incident period, there is a big spike in the number of tweets for the heads of the regulatory authorities. It should be noted that there is an overlap between incident 1 and incident 2.




Figure 139. Total frequency (monthly) of tweets from the regulatory agencies and the heads of the regulatory agencies in the financial sector in the period 2015-2020, incident period marked with grey [Poland]

6. Conclusion

This research report summarises the analysis of media reporting and case studies in the seven participating countries to identify how the media influence trust-building processes towards actors in regulatory regimes, and how it is used by various actors in the regimes to do so. It also documents the methods and approaches used in collecting data.

The report draws on three data sources:

- Traditional news media articles
- Tweets from regulatory authorities and agency heads
- Interviews with actors within the regulatory regimes, including the regulatory authorities

Using these data sources, the report analyses the media coverage in two different types of media, i.e., traditional news media (newspapers) and SoMe (tweets) of regulatory authorities within the food safety-, financial- and data protection sectors between the years 2015 and 2020. Secondly, using interview data and data on media coverage, the report analyses how media coverage is perceived before, during and after regulatory authorities have been involved in incidents of trust violation. In total, 14 cases have been analysed, two from each on the following participating countries: Belgium, Denmark, Israel, The Netherlands, Poland, Spanish, and Switzerland.

Following the coverage of agencies in traditional news media, we highlight the main findings:

- Coverage fluctuates, reflecting, among other things, the incidents we will be discussing below. However, it is also worth noticing that the number of agencies in our data differs from country to country reflecting different national organisations and traditions.
- The number of articles identified across countries and sectors also varies widely; an example could be the coverage of food safety in 2020. Whereas 3 articles were identified in Israel, 201 articles were identified in Spain, indicating the degree to which local events shape data.
- Looking across the seven countries, finance is most frequently the most covered sector. Israel being an exception, where data protection has gained the most coverage. The Netherlands also shows a different picture, as all three sectors have received approximately the same amount of coverage.
- A large majority of coverage is neutral in terms of salience (between 73 and 90 %), among the rest, a negative salience is in general more common than a positive one. Poland is the country with the largest extent of negative coverage totalling 22 % of the identified articles.

Our analysis, hence shows that the majority of coverage of regulatory authorities is neutral in its valence. However, we find substantial differences between the seven countries in our data. Furthermore, we find that the financial area is covered most frequently but when following coverage over time, we see that there are significant variations from year to year and between countries reflecting national developments and incidents.

Analysing the use of Twitter by regulatory authorities and their agency heads, we highlight the following findings:

- Authorities and agency heads tweet to varying degrees across countries and sectors.
- There is a larger tendency for regulatory authorities relative to their agency heads to use Twitter.
- The number of tweets fluctuates from month to month and with several noticeable peak periods within each country and sector, however, as well generally with a tendency to increase the amount of monthly tweets during the period of investigation.
- However, it is important to note, that part of the differences we identify may rest on the fact that the number of regulatory authorities differ between countries which may affect the number of data points between cases.
- The use of Twitter is not equally widespread in all sectors. It is primarily regulatory authorities from the food safety sector and, to a lesser extent, from the financial sector that use Twitter, except for Israel where only the data protection authorities and heads of these authorities use Twitter.



- The use of Twitter is not equally widespread in all countries. Spain is by far the country where the authorities and heads of the authorities tweet the most.
- In relation to the regulatory authorities' use of Twitter during incidents of trust violation, the analysis shows some indications that regulatory authorities increase the number of monthly tweets during the incidents. The incidents are following an increasing frequency of tweets in relation to approximately the half of the incidents, e.g., in the Fipronil case in the Netherlands and in the MRSA case in Denmark. However, as some of the incidents have a long duration, it could also be non-incident related increases that occur over time.
- In relation to the agency heads' use of Twitter during incidents of trust violation, the analysis does not indicate that the frequency of monthly tweets changes during the incidents. It should also be noted that only few agency heads appear to be active on Twitter during the investigation period.

Summing up, our analysis indicates that regulatory authorities in the three sectors and their agency heads increase the frequency of tweets during the period of investigation, and that these increases in some instances appear to occur during the investigated incidents of trust violation. However, we find substantial differences between the seven countries in our data. We find that the use of Twitter by agency heads is not as widespread as the use of Twitter by the regulatory authorities themselves.

Finally, we turn to our case studies which combine interview and analysis of media coverage. Across the 14 case studies presented, we highlight the following findings:

- The media play a number of different roles, reflecting the typology outlined at the outset of this report. We primarily base these claims on the qualitative case studies which were reported above.
 - We find a number of cases, where the media play no substantial role. This is, e.g., the case with regard to the BSI case.
 - We find a number of cases, where the media are seen as playing the role of *infomediary*, however, in some instances, e.g., the Optima case, with limited access to information.
 - We find a number of cases, where the media become active players in the creation of the incident working as *intermediaries*, e.g., the Fipronil/Veviba case, the MRSA case or the Supervision Authority Leadership case.
 - We find a number of cases, where the media becomes a forum for informal accountability in which regulatory agencies explain outcomes and behaviours, which was, to some extent, the case in the Fipronil case or the horsemeat case.
 - We find a number of cases, where the media take on the role of fire alarms, at least experienced by some actors as was, e.g., the case in the GodTV case.
 - Summing up, we most frequently identify situations where stakeholders perceive media as *intermediaries*. However, it may also be worth noting that cases are at times perceived rather differently among stakeholders.
- The incidents described in the case studies deal with all trust dimensions discussed in our theoretical framework; ability, benevolence and integrity. While it is very difficult to balance the different cases against each other, in the quantitative material there is a dominance of cases which deal with ability as an infraction of trust. However, as is also visible from the media coding, the dimensions often appear together.
- As opposed to the media coverage analysed in the first part of the rapport, when looking at specific incidents as done here, media coverage is predominantly negative. A point which emanates both from the coding of news articles and in the interviews. This is not surprising as cases are selected as examples of breaches of trust.
- Criticisms come from a wide array of actors according to the coding of news articles. Often, experts or media actors are active in leveraging criticism, but cases also show regulatees, interest organisations, the regulator itself or other governing actors leveraging criticism. In few cases, international actors are also found to leverage criticism. In most cases, criticisms come from many different types of actors and in a number of cases, a large number of occasions have been identified in data.



- We find that agencies use the media to a very varied extent. Some cases clearly indicate deliberate and active media strategies, whereas others indicate no interaction with media on behalf of the regulatory agency. This is visible in both interviews, case studies and the coding of news articles.
- Looking more specifically on the way agencies address media, we find that a number of strategies are used in the way agencies respond to raised criticisms according to our coding. While agencies do not respond at all in quite a few of the incidents analysed, we also find a number of other strategies like blame shifting, admission of responsibility and denial of problem. Remarkably, these response strategies often appear together. We cannot say based on the data, if they are sequential or appearing simultaneously, but we find a number of cases with quite a few response strategies which at face value seems contradictory.

Summing up, the case studies paint a rich and complex picture of how trust infractions appear, how media influence trust-building processes, and how media are used by actors in regulatory regimes. We find that the role the media play is often perceived quite differently among the actors involved, but often the media are perceived as an active player in defining and framing perceptions of trust infractions. We find that regulatory agencies sometimes use the media actively – using a wide array of (perhaps incompatible) strategies, but we also found quite a few examples where they do not.

Summarising across the three parts of the report, we find that media coverage of regulatory agencies on average is generally neutral, but changes to become negative when cases or incidents like the ones analysed here make it to the headlines. We find that the media are, from time to time, perceived to play an active role in framing the understanding of trust infractions on a basis which is less than accurate. However, perceptions among actors do not align in individual cases. We find that actors involved in the same case have different perceptions of both the cases in question as well as the nature of the infractions studied.

We find that incidents deal with all dimensions of trust, however, with a slight predominance of the ability dimension. We find that in some cases, regulatory agencies are active to rebuild trust after an incident and use the media to do so, but we also find quite a few incidents where regulatory agencies stay quiet.

This report presents the data from the participating countries and clarifies the methods used to collect and analyse data. Deliverable D6.3 will return to the questions raised in the introduction of this report to qualify the answers to the research questions raised in this working package.



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